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ABSTRACT 
Journalist Walter Lippmann and philosopher John Dewey engaged in an extended 
dialogue in the 1920s regarding the condition and future of American democracy. In a 
series of books and essays the two intellectuals confronted issues that have been debated 
since the creation of the American republic and that remain contested today: how public 
opinion is formed; the capacity of individual citizens to render judgments concerning 
public affairs; the role that public opinion ought to play in formulating public policy; the 
possibility of establishing a truly democratic community. This paper argues that the 
issues Lippmann and Dewey addressed and the conclusions they reached are products of 
their experiences during the Progressive Era, World War I, and the immediate post-war 
era, but that they also reflect the characters of each man. While neither man was able to 
fashion wholly satisfactory responses to the challenges of American political life, both 
framed the issues in original and provocative terms that serve well in any contemporary 
discussion of American democracy. 
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The ink on the Declaration of Independence was scarcely dry before many 
of the revolutionary leaders began expressing doubts about the possibility 
of realizing these high hopes . . .  The American people seemed incapable of 
the degree of virtue needed for republicanism . . .  Too many were unwilling 
to respect authority ... By the early 19th century, America had already 
emerged as the most egalitarian, most materialistic, most individualistic 
society in Western history. In many respects this new democratic society 
was the very opposite of the one the revolutionary leaders had envisaged. 
Gordon Wood 
The Radicalism of the American Revolution 1 
In the 1920's John Dewey and Walter Lippmann engaged in an extended dialogue 
regarding the condition and future of American democracy. It was a debate that has been 
called "an epic confrontation" and a "battle for America' s political mind."2 The issues 
that Dewey and Lippmann confronted were issues as old as the American republic .  On 
one side was John Dewey: the philosopher of democracy; a man who had faith in the 
power of education to prepare citizens to become active participants in the democratic 
process; an advocate of a method of scientific inquiry that was available to everyone; 
champion of social justice. On the other side was Walter Lippmann: skeptical of the 
capacity of the public to judiciously govern their lives; a believer in restricting decisions 
regarding public affairs to a modem aristocracy of unusual intellect and of especial 
1 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 229-30. 2 Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc. ,  1995), 159.; John Patrick Diggins, "From Pragmatism to Natural Law: Walter Lippmann's 
Quest for the Foundation of Legitimacy," Political Theory 19, no. 4 (1991): 533. 
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virtue; an advocate of rule by those who possessed expertise; a searcher for bedrock 
principles of social authority and legitimacy. 
There was a curious arc to the relationship between Dewey and Lippmann. The 
books Lippmann wrote during the years before World War I expressed views he would 
later move beyond or disavow. But Dewey was impressed by the pragmatic approach and 
bold energy with which Lippmann engaged the problems of the day. Lippmann became 
managing editor of the New Republic when it began publishing in 1 9 14.  Dewey became a 
regular contributor and the journal served as Dewey' s  principal medium for the 
expression of his views on public affairs over the next twenty years . 3 Dewey found 
himself caught up in the New Republic's and Lippmann' s  enthusiasm for American entry 
into the war in Europe and in a series of essays he enthusiastically advocated their 
position. It was a decision he came to regret so deeply that "like a burnt child who 
shunned the fire" as late as 1939 Dewey was urging Americans to avoid a different war, 
"no matter what."4 World War I also had a profound effect on Lippmann. He came away 
disappointed in the peace negotiations and alarmed at the ease with which public opinion 
was manipulated. In a series of articles and two books written in the first half of the 
decade Lippmann expressed his doubts about the future of American democracy. Dewey 
believed Lippmann had produced "the most effective indictment of democracy as 
currently conceived ever penned."5 In 1926 Dewey took up the challenge and wrote his 
only work of formal political philosophy.6 
3 Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell, 1991), 193. 
4 Cushing Strout, "William James and the Tradition of American Philosophers," Partisan Review, March 
2001, 58.; John Dewey, "No Matter What Happens - Stay Out," Common Sense 3 (1939). 
5 John Dewey, "Public Opinion, "  New Republic 30 (1922). Dewey: The Middle Works 13:337 
6 Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 300. 
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Dewey remained a committed pragmatist and believer in the democratic life the 
remainder of his life. Lippmann' s  thought evolved dramatically as time went on: "No 
contemporary who read Lippmann' s  early books and followed his career could have 
predicted where his thinking would take him by mid-century."7 Once an enthusiastic 
admirer, Dewey became a harsh critic .  
Both men were of the Progressive Era, an age in which Americans still thought to 
a great degree in terms of 19th century values : decentralization, competition, equality, 
agrarian, small town. By 1 920, the contours of 20th century America were triumphant -
centralized, industrialized, secularized, and urbanized.8 John Dewey and Walter 
Lippmann were trying to resolve familiar and ancient issues, but their conversation was 
sharpened in ways peculiar to the era in which it took place and by the people they were. 
The Progressive Era is  generally described as the years between the tum of the 
twentieth century and the end of World War I. The decade before was a momentous 
turning point in American history. In the 1 890s immigration from southern and eastern 
Europe exploded, a consumer culture began to take shape, businesses consolidated, 
political parties were dramatically realigned, and the United States took its place on the 
international stage.9 From 1 893 to 1 897, America suffered the most severe depression it 
had experienced to that point. Populists formed their own political party. A 
"phantasmagoric popular social threat" haunted the nation which was manifested in 
7 Diggins, "From Pragmatism to Natural Law: Walter Lippmann's Quest for the Foundation of Legitimacy," 
522. 
8 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1958; reprint, 1 972. 16th), 43. 
9 Richard L. McCormick, "Public Life in Industrial America, 1 877- 191 7," in The New American History, 
ed. Eric Foner (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 1 17 .  
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"twisted forms in the perceptions of the businessmen, statesmen, and intellectuals" 1 0  The 
Progressive Era originated in these challenges to American life and the accompanying 
sense of anxiety. Progressivism may have been, as Richard Hofstadter wrote, a 
"remarkably good-natured effort" to achieve some measure of "self-reformation.''11 But 
memories of the shock of the last decade of the nineteenth century were not far beneath 
the "surface placidity" of the era. 12 The sense that at any moment things could come 
undone pervades much of Dewey' s and Lippmann ' s  writing from the pre-war period, 
often on the same page they display the optimism of characteristic of the era. 
Out of the Progressive Era came a number of reforms intended to more securely 
bind society. A great deal of the effort was to Americanize immigrants arriving from 
foreign lands, and to urbanize those relocating from American farms. The Progressives 
sought to smooth the conflict between labor and capital. There were measures for 
worker' s  safety, child labor was restricted, cities began to clean up slums. Anti-trust laws 
and business regulations were implemented, tariffs were lowered, postal delivery was 
expanded, savings banks were established, municipal reforms were instituted. 
Constitutional amendments in 19 13  authorized a federal income tax and established 
direct election of senators . The process of Amendments for Prohibition and granting 
women the vote had begun. As historian Richard L. McCormick has described the 
Progressive era: "The formation of settlement houses, the fight for woman suffrage, the 
physicians' campaign for public health, the legal establishment of racial segregation, the 
1° Charles Berquist, Labor and the Course of American Democracy: US History in Latin American 
Perspective (New York: Verso, 1 996), 48. 1 1 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1 955), 5 .  12  "Surface placidity" in Henry F. May, "The Rebellion of the Intellectuals,  1 9 1 2- 1 9 17,"  in Ideas, Faiths 
and Feelings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 983), 1 8 .  
Jesse B .  Markay 
Revised May 2007 
Page 5 of 77 
restriction of immigration, and the regulation of business corporations (however 
diversely) the drive of native, white, middle-class Americans to improve and control the 
often frightening conditions of industrial life." 1 3 
Identifying Progressive reforms is relatively uncontroversial, but characterizing a 
Progressive "Movement" is more problematic .  Historian Arthur Link claimed that 
Progressivism was really a shifting alliance of "many progressive movements" composed 
primarily of interest groups or classes "seeking greater political status and economic 
security." Despite diversity and tensions among the movements, they shared a sense of 
common ideals and mutual objectives . In Link' s  estimation, Progressivism functioned 
successfully during World War I and survived "in a crippled way" through the months 
following the war. But inexorably it came apart. "The important fact about the 
progressive coalition of 1 91 6," Link argued, "was not its strength but its weakness." 14  
Peter Filene challenged the existence of the movement at all in  "An Obituary for The 
Progressive Movement" in which he pronounced that the movement "never existed."1 5 
There is  one certainty regarding the historiography of the era: every historian of 
the era has their own Progressives. Richard Hofstadter' s  Progressives were "victims of 
an upheaval in status . . .  men who suffered . . .  through the changed pattern in the 
distribution of deference and power" that took place around the tum of the 20th century. 1 6  
Jackson Lears argued that the Progressives were really "anti-modernists," deeply 
13 McCormick, "Public Life in Industrial America, 1 877- 1 9 17,"  1 26. 
14 Arthur S .  Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1 920's?" The American Historical 
Review LXIV, no. 4 ( 1 959): 838. 
15 Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary For "The Progressive Movement" , "  American Quarterly 22, no. 1 ( 1970). 
See also Daniel T. Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism," Reviews in American History 10, no. 4 ( 1982) . 
16 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., 135 .  
Jesse B. Markay 
Revised May 2007 
Page 6 of 77 
ambivalent about progress. 17  James Kloppenberg' s  Progressives were a generation of 
radical pragmatic philosophers, searching for alternatives to the philosophic idealism of 
the nineteenth century. 1 8 The Progressives of Daniel Rodgers were cosmopolitan 
reformers inspired by Europeans social democrats. 1 9  For Elizabeth Sanders, politically 
mobilized farmers from the south and west were actually responsible for Progressive 
reform. They were the ones with enough political power to legislate reform when the 
urban North and organized labor were unable get the legislation passed.20 Robert 
Johnston' s  Portland Progressives were radical anti-capitalists.2 1  Gabriel Kolko' s  
Progressives were triumphant commercial interests who "operated on the assumption that 
the general welfare of the community could best be served by satisfying the concrete 
needs of business."22 Casey Nelson Blake wondered if the Progressives suffered from an 
"anxious spasm of middle-class nostalgia for a village culture."23 
Urban middle-class post-Victorians desperate to eliminate social divisions are 
Michael McGerr' s Progressives . "The middle class had not only rejected longstanding 
individualism; it had adopted a new 'creed, '  the will to use association and the state to 
end class conflict and the other problems of industrial capitalism."24 Theda Skocpol sees 
17 Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture 1880-
1 920 (New York: Pantheon Books, 198 1) ,  xiii. 
18 James T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and 
American Thought, 1870-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) . 19 Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). 
20 Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1 999) . 
21 Robert D. Johnston, The Radical Middle Class: Populist Democracy and the Question of Capitalism in 
Progressive Era Portland, Oregon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
22 Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Re-Interpretation of American History, 1900-1916 
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 2-3. 
23 Casey Nelson Blake, "The Lost World of Progressive Reform," Raritan (2005) :  153 .  24 Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 
1870-1920 (New York: Free Press, 2003), 68. 
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the Progressives as reformers "infused with determination to root out 'corrupt' forms of 
party patronage . . .  As corruption was fought the 'public interest could quickly be 
recognized, embodied in reform laws, and implemented by experts . . .  "25 
Some of the historian ' s  Progressives are direct contradictions of each other. Henry 
May's  Progressives believers in the "national credo" which had as its first article of faith 
"the reality, certainty, and eternity of moral values. Words like truth, justice, patriotism, 
unselfishness, and decency were used constantly, without embarrassment, and without 
any suggestion that their meaning might be only of a time and place."26 But Eric 
Goldman saw things differently. The Progressives were moral relativists: "In the year of 
Wilson ' s  inaugural, Lippmann' s  Preface to Politics, presented the first conscious all-
embracing relativism in the discussion of public affairs. It scorned all moral absolutes. 
The book was received with great enthusiasm in Progressive circles ."27 
As he described in The Search for Order, Robert Wiebe's  Progressives were 
members of a confident, educated "new middle class . . .  newly self-conscious business 
men" who sought to devise a world "derived from the regulative, hierarchical needs of 
urban-industrial life." They sought "continuity in a world of endless change."28 On the 
other hand, in Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism, Morton White 
identified a number of intellectuals - Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. , John Dewey, Thorstein 
25 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United 
States (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1 992), 265. 26 Henry May, The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time 1 912-1917 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1959; reprint, 1964), 9. See also Richard M. Abrams, "The Failure of 
Progressivism," in The Shaping of Twentieth Century America, ed. Richard M. Abrams and Lawrence W. 
Levine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 197 1 ) ,  21 1 .  27 Eric Frederick Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform, 25th 
Anniversary ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 173.  28 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1 967), 1 74, xiv. 
Jesse B .  Markay 
Revised May 2007 
Page 8 of 77 
Veblen and Charles Beard - as his Progressives.29 They had in common the rejection of 
the arid forms of nineteenth century. Historian David Hollinger has proposed that the 
complex and sometimes contradictory nature of the Progressive Era (and Walter 
Lippmann in particular) was best captured in the titles of Wiebe' s  and White' s  books: a 
search for order and a revolt against formalism.30 Those two impulses were very much in 
evidence in Dewey and Lippmann, though for Lippmann, what had once been a revolt, 
became a search for formal principles. 
In 1915 ,  Progressive political reformer Benjamin DeWitt described what he 
thought the essence of Progressivism entailed: the removal of corruption from public life; 
increasing popular participation in American politics; the "conviction that the functions 
of government at present are too restricted and that they must be increased and extended 
to relieve social and economic distress."3 1 Given those elements, Henry May's  
observation that Dewey 's  political thought "was inescapably rooted in the Progressive 
Era" rings true. 32 
John Dewey was born in Burlington Vermont in 1 859. Dewey' s  father, who had 
been a quartermaster with a Vermont regiment in the Civil War, supported his family as a 
grocer. His mother was a passionate, evangelical Christian who enquired often regarding 
the state of her son ' s  souls .  He entered the University of Vermont at the age.of fifteen 
29 Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947, 
1949, 1957),  12.  
30 David A. Hollinger, "Science and Anarchy: Walter Lippmann's Drift and Mastery," American Quarterly 
29, no. 5 ( 1 977) : 475 . 
3 1 Benjamin Parke DeWitt, The Progressive Movement: A Non-Partisan, Comprehensive Discussion of 
Current Tendencies in American Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), 5 .  
32 May, The End o f  American Innocence: A Study o f  the First Years o f  Our Own Time 1912-1917, 148-49. 
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where he studied philosophy and the new theory of evolution. He taught high school for a 
year in Oil City, Pennsylvania where he decided to try to make a career of philosophy. 
He returned to Vermont and wrote his first published article, "The Metaphysical 
Assumptions of Materialism." Dewey began graduate work in philosophy at Johns 
Hopkins in 1 882. There for a brief time he studied with Charles Peirce, one of the first to 
hold to the principles of pragmatism. Dewey claimed that it was not until many years 
later that he understood how important Peirce was to the development of American 
philosophy. 33 Dewey began teaching at the University of Michigan in 1 884. He would 
remain there for ten years except for one year at the University of Minnesota. He married 
Alice Chipman in 1 886. Over the next 14 years they had six children, two of whom died 
in this period. In 1 894 Dewey accepted a position at the University of Chicago, then only 
in its second year. He became Chair of the Philosophy, Psychology, and Education 
departments allowing him to pursue an interdisciplinary approach and cultivate ideas that 
stressed the social dimensions of human behavior. He organized the Chicago Laboratory 
School. While in Chicago he met Jane Addams who had a profound impact on Dewey' s  
thought, particularly on his ideas about harmonizing society and overcoming social 
divisions. She was a "radicalizing influence," teaching Dewey much about the politics of 
the big city.34 As biographer Alan Ryan noted: 
Those of Dewey' s  readers who think that Dewey was astonishingly nai"ve about 
the workings of the political system and about the real causes of the irrationality 
and inefficiency of most modem societies may be grateful that he had Jane 
Addams to take him on guided tours of the red-light district and to teach him 
33 John J .  McDermott, "John Dewey: A Biographical Sketch," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. John 
J. McDermott (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), xvii. 
34 Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, 149. 
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about the meat-packing factories and the insanitariness of the food that emerged 
from the hideous place. 35 
Dewey was at the peak of his intellectual powers during his years at Chicago. He 
"lived for the next several decades on the philosophical resources he accumulated in 
Chicago. "36 
Dewey developed the essential tenets of his philosophic pragmatism in those 
years . Dewey rejected the central observations of traditional philosophy. He believed 
that philosophy ought to deal with human problems, not problems concocted by 
philosophers . He had no use for philosophical puzzles that presupposed dichotomies such 
as percept/concept, reason/will, thought/purpose, intellect/emotion, appearance/reality, 
experience/nature, belief/action, theory/practice, facts/values, and self/others . He believed 
in a radical empiricism in which the experiencing subject and experienced object 
constituted one integrated unit. Dewey thought it impossible to ever obtain certain and 
unrevisable knowledge. He believed in a pluralism of experiences, values, and meanings. 
He believed that human action can improve the human condition. The community was 
central to Dewey. The individual was intrinsically constituted by and in her or his social 
relations. In that way individual achievement was inextricably bound with the 
development of community. The creation of a genuinely democratic community 
depended on critical discourse and continual and open communication. Education was the 
essential element for the development of community life. Lived experience was the 
central precept of philosophic inquiry. A community based on inquiry would develop a 
35 Ibid. ,  1 5 1 .  
36 Ibid., 1 54. 
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culture that prized conscious experience. He had a firm faith in science, but by science, 
Dewey meant the systematic application of practical wisdom. 37 
Dewey left the University of Chicago in 1904 under unpleasant and largely 
unexplained circumstances, but the final straw seemed to be the dismissal of Alice 
Chipman Dewey as principal of the Laboratory School. Dewey and family left Chicago 
for New York where Dewey became professor of philosophy at Columbia University and 
lecturer at Teachers College. In New York he played a more active role in public affairs 
than he had in Chicago. 
His exposure to Hegel at Hopkins "left a permanent deposit" in his thinking 
despite subsequent transformations in his philosophical outlook.38 Particularly important 
to Dewey' s  mature philosophy were two of Hegel ' s  arguments . First, individuals could 
never be isolated from their history, culture, or environment. Second was that Hegel ' s  
thought satisfied, as Dewey explained, " a  demand for unification that was doubtless an 
intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-
matter could satisfy." Dewey's "demand for unification" formed a basis of his 
pragmatism. In his brief and only attempt at autobiography, Dewey wrote in 1930, "The 
sense of divisions and separations that were, I suppose, borne in upon me as a 
consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self 
from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful oppression - or, 
37 Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1996), 8 . ,  Casey Nelson Blake, Beloved Community: The Cultural Criticsm of 
Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank , & Lewis Mumford (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina, 1 990), 86-88 .  
38 John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in  Contemporary American Philosophers, ed. 
George Plimpton Adams and William Pepperell Montague (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930) 
(reprint Later Works 5 : 1 53), 153 .  
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rather, they were an inward laceration."39 Overcoming the "divisions and separations" 
Dewey found in philosophic permeated his pragmatism and was at the core of his 
political philosophy. 
In 19 13 ,  when Walter Lippmann' s  first book was published, Dewey was fifty four 
years old and acknowledged as America' s foremost educator and philosopher. 
Walter Lippmann was born in New York City in 1 889.40 His father was a 
successful investor and Lippmann was raised in comfort, traveling to Europe yearly with 
his art-loving and collecting parents. John Morton Blum, historian and editor of 
Lippmann' s  correspondence, observed that even as a child Lippmann led an "ordered 
life," which developed into a life-long sense of discipline, control and self-possession.41 
He attended private schools in New York City and in 1 906 entered Harvard with a class 
that included John Reed, Heyward Broun and T. S. Eliot. While at Harvard, Lippmann 
worked with the poor in Boston, founded the Harvard Socialist Club and wrote for 
journals concerned with social justice. 
An editorial Lippmann had written in 1908 caught the attention of William James 
and so impressed the Harvard professor that James introduced himself to Lippmann and 
asked him to tea. From that day on Lippmann visited with James weekly, confiding to his 
mother that his first conversation with James was "the greatest thing that happened to me 
in my college life." When James died Lippmann wrote, "I love James more than any very 
39 Ibid., 154. 
40 Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 2. 
41 John Morton Blum, "Walter Lippmann and the Problem of Order," in Public Philosopher: Selected 
Letters of Walter Lippmann, ed. John Morton Blum (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1985), xi. 
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great man I ever saw."42 James reinforced Lippmann' s sense of the importance of 
experimentation, pluralism and action. Graham Wallas spent a year at Harvard as visiting 
professor while Lippmann was a student. In 1908 Wallas wrote Human Nature in Politics 
in which he contended that politics, like human life, was essentially an irrational 
phenomenon, a claim that Lippmann would take up in his first book. Wallas was so 
impressed by Lippmann that he dedicated his 1914 work, The Great Society, to his 
former student. 
Lippmann was also drawn to George Santayana, the Spanish philosopher who 
taught at Harvard.43 There were stark differences between James' s  pragmatic pluralism 
and Santayana's search for absolute moral values. Lippmann referred to James frequently 
in his early works, but his later work bore Santayana' s imprint.44 Santayana chose 
Lippmann to be his teaching assistant and groomed him as his successor in Harvard's  
philosophy department.45 "In later years, Lippmann claimed i t  was Santayana who saved 
him from becoming a pragmatist. Throughout his life, Lippmann sought an order in the 
universe which the intellectual could articulate for a society uncertain of its goals."46 
Lippmann left Harvard after graduating in 1910  and began writing for a Boston 
newspaper. He left that position to work for renowned muckraking journalist Lincoln 
42 Walter Lippmann, "An Open Mind: William James," in William James Remembered, ed. Linda Simon 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1996), 253 .  
43 James, Santayana, Wallas and Lincoln Steffens (and Dewey?) were among a number of  older men drawn 
to Lippmann, as he was to them. Historian James Kloppenberg noted in this regard Lippmann's "ability to 
ingratiate himself with older men who thought they saw in him a younger version of themselves." 
Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American 
Thought, 1870-1920, 490 fn. 43.; see also Ronald Steel, "Walter Lippmann," in Invisible Giants: Fifty 
Americans Who Shaped the Nation but Missed the History Books, ed. Mark C. Carnes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) , 177.  
44 Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, 2 1 .  
45 Steel, "Walter Lippmann," 1 75.  
46 William E. Leuchtenburg, "Walter Lippmann's Drift and Mastery," in Drift and Mastery (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall ,  Inc, 1961 ) ,  2. 
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Steffens at the magazine Everybody's. In 1912  Lippmann joined the administration of 
George Lunn, a socialist who had been elected mayor of Schenectady, New York. 
Historian Melvyn Dubofsky has noted that, "socialism in this period had become 
Americanized." One million votes were cast for Eugene V. Debs in the 19 12  presidential 
election. In the years from 1910  to 1912  socialist mayors were elected in Madison, 
Berkeley, Scranton, Bridgeport, Butte and Schenectady.47 Lippmann was attracted to 
socialism out of distaste for the haphazard disorganized way society operated, rather than 
out of concern for the wretched of the earth.48 Lippmann left Lunn' s  administration after 
four months, disillusioned with the prospects of establishing a socialist haven in the idylls 
of Schenectady. He returned to New York City where a publisher friend urged Lippmann 
to write a book about politics. Lippmann retired to the woods of Maine to write his first 
book. His purpose was to diagnose public disaffection from the political process. To a 
great extent it was an aberration, because it was the only book he would write in which he 
proposed unleashing human energy, rather than finding means to harness it. 
A Preface to Politics was published within months of the presidential election of 
1 9 1 2  in which Democrat Woodrow Wilson was victorious. It was a "remarkable" 
election in which Theodore Roosevelt, running on the Progressive Party ticket, received 
three million votes and Debs received another one million votes.49 Despite the significant 
number of votes cast for third party candidates, the total number of voters declined from 
the 1908 election, continuing a trend that had begun in 1 896. Participation in presidential 
47 Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (New York: 
Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1969; reprint, 1973), 1 3 .  
48 Steel, "Walter Lippmann, "  177 .  
49  Alan Dawley, Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 199 1 ) ,  137 .  
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elections had dropped precipitously since 1896 when approximately 80% of those 
eligible voted. In the 1912  election only 58% of those eligible chose to participate.50 
Lippmann argued in A Preface to Politics that politics had an "unreal connection 
to actual conditions."5 1  The failure of political institutions to address the real concerns of 
the American public was the source of public apathy toward politics. That failure was 
also responsible for corruption in business and government, the bete noir of progressives. 
Alternatives to formal government ("the real, but invisible governments") thrived 
because they stepped into the breach between state and public.52 Parties, political 
machines, trade unions, political and social clubs, and powerful corporate interests 
operated independent of legal restrictions.53 The "thought processes in Washington were 
too lumbering for the needs of the nation" and the government had become largely 
irrelevant. 54 
"Routineers" dominated American politics, politicians who lacked imagination 
and simply and blindly followed precedent. "They imitate the old-fashioned thing their 
grandfather did, and ignore the originality which enabled him to do it."55 The category 
was not limited to conservatives. Good government advocates were only searching for 
easier ways of doing things; "tinkering reformers" were still routineers. Nor were radicals 
50 Walter Dean Burnham, The Current Crisis in American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1 982), 136.  Participation calculated over the entire period 1 900 to 1916  declined by 1 8% when compared 
to the previous sixteen year period. See Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American 
Political Universe," American Political Science Review 59, no. 1 ( 1 965) :  10.  
51 Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics (New York: Kennerly, 1 9 1 3) (reprint, 1962 Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press), 23 . 
52 Ibid., 20. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 28. 
55 Ibid., 10.  
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much better; they sought only to impose new kinds of routines .56 Even progressive 
reform appeared to Lippmann as monotonous, trivial and irrelevant. 
Routineers tried to eliminate evil by outlawing it, by devising modem "taboos" in 
the guise of laws. This was a fundamental theme of A Preface to Politics. Lippmann 
believed Freud, particularly his theories regarding sublimation, could help explain 
politics ' inability to satisfy human desire. 57 Instead of ignoring emotional responses, or 
trying to outlaw them, Lippmann argued that politics needed to redirect them towards 
socially beneficial ends. Legislating against conduct merely created the kind of neurotic 
behavior Freud believed came from repressing human impulses. Politics, wrote 
Lippmann, would always be irrelevant to the public ' s  business "if the only method it 
knows is to ostracize the desires it cannot manage."58 Lippmann particularly admired 
Jane Addams for her treatment of human foibles without oppressive moralizing.59 
Historian Charles Forcey observed that there were others who had made this kind 
of argument without the "penumbra of semi-scientific jargon." Graham Wallas had done 
so in 1 908 in his Human Nature in Politics.60 Twenty years before, sociologist Lester 
Ward had attacked legislation for being more concerned with preventing crime than for 
preparing citizens for constructive work. In 1907, another sociologist, Edward A. Ross, 
had argued along similar lines in Sin and Society. 61 Lippmann railed against anti-trust 
laws, arguing that trusts were the result of greed, a natural human trait. Simply outlawing 
56 Ibid. ,  12.  
57  Freud took notice of A Preface to Politics and referred to it  as the first practical attempt to apply his 
psychology to politics. See Charles Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Wey!, Lippmann, and the 
Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961) ,  109. 
58 Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 34. 
59 Ibid., 40. 6° Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 109. 61 Ibid. ,  1 1 1 . 
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trusts would never work; a claim that had also been made by progressive authors Walter 
Weyl and Herbert Croly. "For Lippmann as for Croly and Weyl the example of 
government 'repression' most frequently cited was the Sherman Anti-Trust Act."62 
William James, in his 1910  essay "The Moral Equivalent of War," had also pursued this 
theme: "Military feelings are too deeply grounded to abdicate their place among our 
ideals until better substitutes were offered."63 
The first step towards creating a new political order would be to discard "the 
futile hopes of mechanical perfection so consistently blasted by natural facts" so that we 
might harness "human power for human purposes . . .  political power to the nation' s  
needs."64 The founders and drafters of the American Constitution "had a rather pale god, 
they had only a speaking acquaintance with humanity, so they put their faith in a scaffold, 
and it has been part of our natural piety to pretend that they succeeded." 65 Mechanical 
politics denatured politics by removing personality, an effort that "ran against the grain of 
living forces, the result is a deceptive theory of politics." 66 Politics ought to encourage 
creativity, but when it became purely mechanical it ceased to engage the real energy of 
the nation. Disappointment in government resulted from its failure to perform to 
expectations, the result of representatives being "trained to interpret a constitution, 
instead of a life . . .  they worship man and distrust men"67 
62 Ibid., 1 1 3.  
63 William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in Writings, 1902-1910 (New York: The Library of 
America, 1 9 1 0), 1 28 1 .  64 Lippmann, A Preface t o  Politics, 2 1-22. 65 Ibid., 17 .  66 Ibid. , 18 .  67 Ibid., 3 1 .  
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Lippmann advocated development of specialized expertise to reorient the political 
process. In familiar Progressive fashion he believed experts could improve working 
conditions ,  prisons, child care, vocational guidance, and education. Experts could help 
Americans break out of "the ruts" they were in.68 There was a role for art: "Art enlarges 
experience by admitting us to the inner life of others ."69 While he argued that 
concentration of economic power was not always a problem, the state had the 
responsibility to develop creative means to intelligently direct the trusts rather than 
allowing them to "run wild."70 
Apparent in A Preface to Politics was Lippmann ' s  admiration for John Dewey 
and his pragmatic philosophy. It was a sentiment Lippmann expressed in essays and 
reviews published in the New Republic in 19 15  and 1 9 1 6. Dewey's  Democracy and 
Education was a "great book," one "rich in the wisdom which democracies need." Dewey 
possessed the "most powerful intellect devoted to the future·of American civilization." 
He had done what creative thinkers must do; he had "extracted a philosophy out of the 
possibilities which exist in our world."7 1  
Lippmann applauded Dewey's  call for philosophy designed to meet the needs and 
purposes of men and women. Heretofore, Lippmann wrote, philosophy' s  claim was that it 
"determined us; we conformed to it." But the greatest value of Dewey' s  work in 
Lippmann' s  eyes was the frank recognition that philosophy had always been the product 
of particular people at particular times, "a human being' s adjustment of his desires to his 
limitations." Lippmann understood Dewey to be saying that philosophy was a projection 
68 Ibid. ,  56. 69 Ibid., 85-86. 
70 Ibid., 26-27. 
71 Walter Lippmann, "The Hope of Democracy," New Republic (1916): 231. 
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of the "very soul" of the philosopher, an autobiographical statement of sorts. "Let us 
continue to write autobiographies," Lippmann wrote, "but let us be sure that we know 
they are autobiographies." Dewey had urged that philosophers should put away the 
"illusions of divinity with which they s.hrouded their work. That pretentiousness is the 
enemy. It turns human thoughts into monstrous absolutes, and takes the impossible 
position that some of man's  thoughts are too sacred for man ' s  criticism."72 David 
Hollinger has observed that Lippmann ' s  early work was a "vehicle for precisely the 
combination of hopes and aspirations found in the classic texts of the pragmatist 
philosophers ."73 
Sounding much like the pragmatic Dewey, Lippmann, in A Preface to Politics, 
declined to outline hard and fast policies because to do so "inverts the whole order of 
things" and created "theoretical tangles and pseudo-problems."74 He proclaimed that "no 
axiom can ever be a substitute for what really makes life worth living . . .  each man in his 
inward life is  a last judgment on all his values ." That is, "the goal of action is in its final 
analysis aesthetic and not moral - a quality of feeling instead of conformity to rule."75 
Words like "justice, harmony, power, democracy," he wrote, "are simply empirical 
suggestions which may produce the good life." But modern men and women were under 
no obligation to adhere to traditional standards, "we should be idolatrous fools to do 
so."76 In Lippmann' s  "revolt against formalism," he wrote, "If only men kept their minds 
72 Walter Lippmann, "The Footnote," in Early Writings (New York: Liveright, 1970), 307-10. 
73 David A. Hollinger, "The Problem of Pragmatism in American History," The Journal of American 
History 67, no. 1 ( 1 980) : 103. 
74 Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 1 5 1 .  
75 Ibid., 1 52. 
76 Ibid. 
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"freed from formalism, idol worship, fixed ideas and exalted abstractions man 's  
experience becomes the center of  thought."77 
The type of statesman Lippmann envisioned would be one who regarded all social 
organizations as an instrument. "Systems, institutions and mechanical contrivances have 
for him no virtue of their own: they are valuable only when they serve the purposes of 
men. He uses them, of course, but with a constant sense that men have made them, that 
new ones can be devised."78 It was the willing, deliberate, conscious individual who 
ought, in Lippmann' s  view, to be at the center of the system. There was a need for men 
(and they were always men to Lippmann, though he frequently noted the inequity of 
excluding women from political and social power) who were "aggressively active 
towards the world which gives man a miraculous assurance that the world is something 
he can make."79 
There were those, including his mentor Graham Wallas, who were troubled by 
Lippmann' s  apparent conviction that man 's  irrational impulses were stronger than reason. 
As Charles Forcey observed, what Lippmann seemed to be looking for was a leader 
creative and imaginative enough "who could save the class fro� its own stupidity."80 
Walter Leuchtenburg noted, "Lippmann' s  celebration of the autonomous untrammeled 
will ran the peril of embracing an outright anti-intellectualism."8 1 Lippmann soon 
77 Ibid., 153 .  
78 Ibid., 12. 
79 Ibid. ,  15 . .  
8° Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Wey!, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 1 15 .  
8 1 Leuchtenburg, "Walter Lippmann's Drift and Mastery," 5 .  
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disavowed the celebration of "irrational impulsive humanism" on display in A Preface to 
Politics. 82 
There is  a considerable shift from the concerns Lippmann described in A Preface 
to Politics to those revealed in the book he completed eighteen months later, Drift and 
Mastery. Lippmann was now less concerned with unleashing the dormant energy of the 
American public than he was with harnessing that energy. He was troubled by the 
potential for anarchic frenzy "against the chaos of a new freedom."83 He was concerned 
about a public thrown into confusion, unable to cope with the freedom that came from 
escaping the restraints of tradition. Only a civic minded elite, it seemed, could save the 
public from themselves . 
Traditional forms of authority had been overthrown: 
We inherit freedom and have to use it .  The sanctity of property, the patriarchal 
family, hereditary caste, the dogma of sin, obedience to authority - the rock of 
ages, in brief, has been blasted for us. Those who are young today are born into a 
world in which the foundations of the older order survive only as habits or by 
default. 84 
The problem then, as Lippmann saw it, was that "we don' t  know how to behave 
when personal contact and eternal authority have disappeared . . .  we have changed our 
environment more quickly than we know how to change ourselves ."85 The very 
perception of impermanence was daunting in itself. Churches were empty, not because of 
indifference on the part of the parishioners, but because of their intellectual failure to deal 
with the sudden change in civilization. The public was disillusioned by the judicial 
82 Merle Eugene Curti, Human Nature in American Thought: A History (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1980), 355. 
83 Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest (New York: Mitchell 
Kennerley, 19 14) ;  (reprint, 1985.  Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.) ,  17 .  
84 Ibid. ,  15 .  
85 Ibid . ,  92. 
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system. "It is the bad sociology of judges and their class prejudices that are destroying the 
prestige of the bench."86 Traditional political units were poorly suited for the age; unions, 
boards of trade, cooperative societies acted as "little governments" instead. "The world is  
so complex," Lippmann wrote, "that no official government can be devised to deal with 
it."87 America stood at a time of unprecedented change, nostalgic for its past, naively 
optimistic about its future, unable to master the present. "We have lost authority. We are 
'emancipated' from an ordered world. We drift."88 
Americans were particularly uneasy about the power of business and they looked 
to government to buffer them from unbridled economic power. 89 The public had 
concluded that "private commercialism is an antiquated, feeble, mean, and unimaginative 
way of dealing with the possibilities of modern industry."90 The size of economic units 
needed to be addressed by the "new science of administration" rather than mechanically 
restricting economic size. Lippmann supposed that government would eventually take 
over ownership of railroads and then steel, oil, lumber and coal, "private property will 
melt away." But there isn ' t  any sense in Drift and Mastery that this was something to be 
hoped for because a more just society would result. Lippmann' s  complaint was that 
private property was an inefficient way to organize things. The solution to problems of 
the American economy were purely technical, a matter only of combining popular control 
with administrative power.91 
86 Ibid. ,  93-95 . 
87 Ibid., 96. 
88 Ibid., 1 1 1 .  
89 Ibid. ,  29. 
90 Ibid . ,  36. 
91 Ibid., 87 . 
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What thwarted the growth of American civilization, Lippmann observed, was the 
"murky vision of what we grandiloquently call the 'will of the people."' 92 This was an 
issue that Lippmann and Dewey would return to later in the 20s. Questions regarding the 
identification of the "public interest" generally turn on determining what the "interest" is .  
But for both Lippmann and Dewey, the first step was to identify the "public." In Drift 
and Mastery Lippmann argued that there were in fact multiple American publics, each of 
them being held back by their failure to recognize the potential for power within them. 
Consumers constituted one public, though their complete independence was doubtful, 
something that Thorstein Veblen had argued.93 In any event, Lippmann claimed that 
granting women the vote would increase the political power of consumers enormously: 
"The mass of women do not look at the world as do workers; in America at least their 
prime interest is as consumers. They have more time for politics than men, and it is no 
idle speculation to say that their influence will make the consumer the real master of the 
political situation."94 Woman, as producers, constituted another public, one with growing 
influence. The rights too longed denied to women would not be withheld much longer, 
"in fact, they will be forced upon millions of women who never trouble to ask for any of 
92 Ibid . ,  8 .  
93 See for instance, Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1 899, 1 9 1 2; reprint, 1 959. New York: Mentor Book), 60. 
94 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest, 54. Lippmann was not 
noticing anything that had not been noticed before in what Meg Jacobs has called "purchasing power 
progressives."( Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) ,  77. The National Consumers League came into being in 1 898 
when local leagues decided to form a national office to promote the interests of consumers. Florence 
Kelley's appointment as general secretary in 1 898 led to a significant increase in membership and an 
enlarged public presence. Kelley, with her "rage for social justice" was able to use the power of an 
organized public to expand state responsibility for the welfare of women and children. (Kathryn Kish Sklar, 
"Two Political Cultures in the Progressive Era: The National Consumers' League and the American 
Association for Labor Legislation," in U.S. History as Women's History: New Feminist Essays, ed. Linda 
K. Kerber, Alice Kessler-Harris, and Kathryn Kish Sklar. Chapel Hill :  The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1995) .  
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these rights ." What was uncertain was the form this life, replete with new freedom, would 
take. "Each step in the woman ' s  movement is creative. There are no precedents whatever, 
not even bad ones."95 Lippmann acknowledged the work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman in 
promoting alternatives to "housekeeping arrangements inherited from the early 
Egyptians."96 Lippmann predicted a number of things would be done collectively: 
The idea of having forty kitchens, forty furnaces, forty laundries, and forty useless 
backyards in one square block, managed by forty separate and overworked 
women, each going helplessly to market, each bringing up children by rule of 
thumb, -- all that is a kind of individualism which the world will get away from.97 
Labor was another public. Lippmann asserted that unions were currently 
obstructionist, but without unions, industrial democracy was impossible and "without 
democracy in industry . . .  there is no democracy in America."98 The real peril to America, 
he argued, was the existence of "great masses of unorganized and perhaps unorganizable 
workers ."99 In the end, "the hopes of democracy are bound up with the labor 
movement."'00 
Lippmann proposed a litany of solutions for the problems of publics adrift 
without providing any methods of implementation, something he would deride in the 20s. 
Industry had to be reformed through education. A survey of American natural resources 
95 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest, 1 23 .  
96 Ibid., 124. 
97 Ibid., 128.  Lippmann was describing the sort of innovation Charlotte Perkins Gilman had advocated: 
"The home cares and industries, give no play for her increasing specialization . . .  the woman who is able to 
do one of these things perfectly, and by so much less able to be all other, suffers doubly from not being able 
to do what she wants to do, and from being forced to do what she does not want to do." (Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman, Women & Economics: A Study of the Economic Relation between Men and Women as a Factor in 
Social Evolution. Small, Maynard & Company: Boston, 1 898; reprint, 1 966. New York: Harper & Row), 
1 55 .  
98 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest, 58 .  
99 Ibid., 64. 
JOO Ibid. ,  67. 
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had to be undertaken. The railroads had to serve the development of our natural 
resources. Waste and graft had to be eliminated. Vast sums of money had to be found to 
implement methods to humanize labor. A new class of properly educated business men 
had to be created. The banking system had to be revamped so as to provide credit at the 
lowest possible costs. Methods of integrated the worker as an essential part of his 
industry had to be found. Unions had to recognize their responsibility for more than the 
narrow interests of their members to become "understanding directing partners of 
business." For some industries, public ownership had to be undertaken, for others, 
cooperative societies had to be developed. A variety of consumer protections had to be 
administered. The consumer had to be made more discriminating; he had to "civilize his 
desires." 1 0 1  Lippmann recognized the uncertainties of the modem age as a "thousand 
terrors ." Only when "society is intelligent enough to make destitution impossible" and 
guaranteed a minimum of security for everyone could there be progress. "Social 
hesitancy will disappear. . .  every issue will not be fought as if life depended upon it, and 
mankind will have emerged from a fear economy." Lippmann argued that change had to 
be a "matter of invention and deliberate experience." 102 
We can no longer treat life as something that has trickled down to us. We have to 
deal with it deliberately, devise its social organization, alter its tools, formulate its 
method, educate and control it. In endless ways we put intention where custom 
has reigned. We break up routines, make decision, choose our ends, select 
means. 1 03 
As historian David Hollinger has observed, the "mastery" Lippmann was 
proposing to utilize to overcome the "drift" of modem life was the discipline of 
I O I  Ibid., 95-98. 102 Ibid., 176. 103 Ibid., 1 47 .  
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science. 1 04 Lippmann had his own idea about what science was. It was a method and 
spirit rather than a fixed body of knowledge. The intersubjectivity of science meant that 
from the same set of facts, men and women would come to the same conclusions; it 
would provide the discipline and passion necessary to unite and inspire disparate 
civilizations. Because of advancements in science, "Lippmann encouraged people to 
believe they would be organized, efficient, functional and under firm control without 
sacrificing impulse, choice, fantasy, and liberty." 1 05 The difference between A Preface to 
Politics and Drift and Mastery is that in the latter the emphasis  is on "firm control." 
Dewey was in complete agreement with Lippmann about America adrift. His 
support for entry into World War I was predicated on the hope that war would shock 
Americans out of their complacency. He believed that science: directed, conscious, 
reflective inquiry was the key to the problems of American democracy. But the science 
that Lippmann advocated was more akin to managerial expertise than it was to the sort of 
science that John Dewey extolled. "Dewey was confident that since the method of 
experimental science and the processes of democracy were basically congenial, even 
parallel, democracy' s more realistic hopes lay in science . . .  yet science remained the 
property of a limited technology." 1 06 That was the problem in Dewey' s  mind, that science 
was available to only a portion of society. It did not have to be that way. Dewey' s  science 
was available to everyone; that was the purpose of education. Dewey' s  contemporary, 
104 Hollinger, "Science and Anarchy: Walter Lippmann's Drift and Mastery, " 463. 105 Ibid. :  469. 106 David W. Marcell, Progress and Pragmatism: James, Dewey, Beard, and the American Idea of 
Progress (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1 974), 244. 
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William English Walling wrote this of Dewey, "If Dewey expects science to guide us, 
this does not mean that he expects scientists to guide us." 107 
In Drift and Mastery Lippmann wrote, "Democracy in politics is the twin brother 
of scientific thinking . . .  the scientific spirit is the discipline, the escape from drift, the 
outlook of a free man."108 This was a portent of things to come in Lippmann' s  developing 
thought. Science could be possessed by only a few. But if science belonged to the 
experts , who owned democracy? Dewey had a very different idea. As David Marcell 
observed, Dewey insisted that "science had to be democratized and democracy made 
scientific before true progress could be assured . . .  Progress was the cornerstone of the 
entire range of John Dewey' s  thought." 109 Historian John Recchuiti, writing about the 
development of social science in the Progressive Era wrote, "This unresolved tension 
between science as elitist enterprise and science as democratizing force was a formative 
and unresolved paradox ."1 1 0 
The first issue of the New Republic was published in 19 14. Willard and Dorothy 
Whitney Straight provided the finances. 1 1 1  Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and Walter 
107 Quoted in Robert Westbrook, Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005)., 122. 108 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest, 151. After writing most of 
this paper, I came across something regarding this particular sentence from Drift and Mastery written by 
James Kloppenberg, "This was precisely the argument that Dewey had tried repeatedly to make, but he 
never made it more persuasively - perhaps because he never made it so clearly." Kloppenberg, Uncertain 
Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920, 320. I 
would take no issue regarding the "clearly" portion, but while the language may seem to express a 
Deweyan thought, in context, it does not seem to be the argument Dewey repeatedly made. 109 Marcell, Progress and Pragmatism: James, Dewey, Beard, and the American Idea of Progress, 244, 47. 1 10 John Recchuiti, Civic Engagement: Social Science and Progressive-Era Reform in New York City 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 13. 1 1 1  The Straights are one of the three Progressive era families Eric Rauchway considers in The Refuge of 
Affections. Of the Straights he writes: "[They] created it to fulfill the shared elements of their reform 
agendas and thus to give their marriage a public presence. These shared elements comprised a set of 
convictions about their duty to the benighted, who were in this case a public that required education on 
political matters sot that it could manage its own affairs and become truly self-governing." Eric Rauchway, 
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Lippmann were the editors. 1 1 2  They described the magazines mission in terms that were 
congenial with Dewey' s  views regarding the participation of public intellectuals in 
guiding public opinion and Dewey contributed the first of some160 of his essays the New 
Republic would publish over the years. When the Lusitania was attacked in May 1915 ,  
Walter Lippmann and the New Republic began advocating preparedness for the 
possibility that the United States would be drawn into the war. Their sympathies were 
clear: the Lusitania "having united Engli shmen and Americans in a common grief and a 
common indignation," might ultimately "unite them in a common war and a common 
destiny." 1 1 3 Soon after, Dewey began to express his own sentiment in favor of preparing 
for war. 
By 1 9 1 5  Dewey was assailing German philosophy, arguing that German 
romanticism and a fixation on philosophic dualisms produced Germany' s militarism and 
belligerence. 1 14 Dewey made it clear that he believed German aggression would not end 
on its own and that Americans ought to be prepared for war. From the early 191h century, 
the course of German history could be reduced to the thought of one man, Immanuel 
Kant. German exaltation of the state, something Dewey found repulsive, was a climax of 
the "line of moral regeneration which took its start from Kant." Moral duty became 
The Refuge of Affections: Family and American Reform Politics, 1900-1920 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001) ,  32. 
1 1 2  Croly in 1 909 made the claim that achievement of "our American national destiny" depended on 
national action directed by national leaders. The Progressive Croly sounded very different than the 
Progressive Dewey and his radical participatory democracy. Herbert David Croly, The Promise of 
American Life (New York: Bibliobazaar, 1 909; reprint, 2006),  33 .  
1 1 3  Quoted in Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, 89. 
1 14 John Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics ( 1 9 1 5 ;  reprint, Middle Works. Vol : 8) .  
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equated with political subservience; moral obligation merged into political obedience; 
rational thought overwhelmed by emotion. 1 1 5 
In the summer of 1 9 1 6  Dewey began writing a series of essays published in the 
New Republic, the Atlantic Monthly, and Seven Arts extolling the benefits that would 
accrue with America' s entry into the war. The first pieces were ostensibly concerned with 
education, but in a deeper sense they were oriented towards an analysis of the process of 
social integration. He displayed an enthusiasm for war that had little to do with the direct 
aims of any war-making effort. Dewey spiritedly predicted that war would provoke a 
reassessment of the America educational system. 1 16 He recognized proposals for 
universal military service that would assimilate immigrants and develop within them a 
sense of public responsibility, a very Progressive sort of program. Though he did not hold 
out any hope that a program compelling service would be successful, he was gratified 
that there had been an awakening to the fact that immigrants remained as alienated from 
the general society as they were on the day they arrived in America. 1 1 7 
As biographer Alan Ryan has noted, "Dewey' s communitarianism is more than 
communitarianism of the neighborhood. He was a benign, mild, and good-natured 
nationalist, but he was a nationalist." 1 1 8  Dewey argued that the possibility of war had 
"forced men out of narrow sectionalisms into a larger social unit," though he warned of 
nationalism purchased through appeals to fears, suspicions, jealousies and latent hatreds. 
1 15 Ibid., 227-28. Thorstein Veblen took a similar position in his Imperial Germany and the Industrial 
Revolution, published in 1915, the same year Dewey' s  German Philosophy and Politics was published. 
Veblen argued that Germany was driven by an "unstable cultural compound" of idealism and industrial 
efficiency. Quoted in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 234. 1 16 John Dewey, "Our Educational Ideal in Wartime," New Republic 6 (1916). 1 17 John Dewey, "Universal Service as Education,"  New Republic 6 ( 1916). 1 1 8 Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, 156. 
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But, surprisingly, he argued that America' s exceptional history militated against the rise 
of aggressive nationalism. Even America' s nationalism would be exceptional, "our unity 
cannot be a homogenous thing" as was Europe' s .  American nationalism would be based 
on intelligence and scientific planning; it would not take social organization for granted. 
War would mean that the "melting pot" would be transformed into a "symphony." 1 19 War 
would create the conditions in which "hyphenism" would be welcomed "in the sense of 
extracting from each people its special good . . .  The point is to see that the hyphen 
connects instead of separates ." To develop the "symphony," the American educational 
system would need to be "nationalized in a way which recognizes that the peculiarity of 
our nationalism is its intemationalism."1 20 
By late 1 916 ,  Dewey was sure that war was coming: 
We can hardly welcome the war merely because it has made us think, and has 
made us realize how many of the things we called thoughts were asylums for 
laziness. But since the war has come, we may welcome whatever revelations of 
our stupidity and carelessness it brings with it, and set about the institution of a 
more manly and more responsible faith in progress than that in which we indulged 
in the past. 12 1  
War would force Americans to make a reassessment of th�ir fundamental beliefs, most 
importantly the idea that progress was inevitable. "Even a great and devastating war," he 
wrote, "is not too great a price to pay for an awakening from such an infantile and selfish 
1 19The image of America as an orchestra was one that Progressive intellectual Horace Kallen had utilized in 
191 5: "So in society each ethnic group is a natural instrument. . .  all make the symphony of civilization." 
Horace Kallen, "Democracy Versus the Melting Pot," The Nation, Feb. 18, 25, 1915. Randolph Bourne 
believed that out of the exchange between immigrants and native-born a new culture would develop. 
Randolph Bourne, "Trans-National America," The Atlantic 1 18 ( 1916) .  
120 John Dewey, "Nationalizing Education, " Journal of Education 84 ( 1916) .  
121 John Dewey, "Progress," International Journal of Ethics 26 ( 19 16) : 234. 
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dream. Progress is not automatic; it depends upon human intent and aim and upon 
acceptance of responsibility for its production." 1 22 
The United States entered the war in April 19 17,  but as historian David Kennedy 
has observed, "Americans went to war in 1917  not only against Germans in the field of 
France but against each other at home." 123 Dewey refused to believe that America' s entry 
into the war was the cause of increasingly frequent outbreaks of violence against 
German-Americans and those who opposed entry: "Much of the violence of current 
intolerance is unconscious testimony that the diverse ingredients of our population are 
not, after all, so integrated as we desire." 1 24 Dewey retained his faith that intolerance 
coincident with war would be expunged by the reorganization war would foster. But by 
late 1917  Dewey was forced to confront the unanticipated consequences of war. Congress 
had passed sweeping laws dealing with espionage, sedition and trading with the enemy. 
These laws made it possible that virtually any criticism of the Wilson Administration 
could be ruled illegal. 1 25 Dewey argued that those who made irresponsible accusations 
against people they disagreed with were themselves culpable of disloyalty and sedition. 
"I do not think to defeat Prussianism abroad it is necessary to establish Prussianism at 
home." 1 26 
In 1915 ,  Randolph Bourne then an admiring student wrote of Dewey, "Professor 
Dewey has given us a whole new language of meaning. After reading him, you can see 
122 Ibid. : 238. 
123 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford, 1980), 
4 1 .  
124 John Dewey, "In Explanation of Our Lapse," New Republic 1 3  ( 1 9 17) :  294. 
125 Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny : A History of Modern American Reform, 196. 
126 John Dewey, "Democracy and Loyalty in the Schools," New York Post, December 1 9, 1917 .  
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nothing again in the old terms."1 27 Just two years later, Bourne reacted in horror as 
Dewey stridently advocated American entry into World War I: 
What I come to is a sense of suddenly being left in the lurch, of suddenly finding 
that a philosophy upon which I had relied to carry us through no longer 
works . . .  Professor Dewey and his friends felt that the forces were too strong for 
them, that the war had to be, and it was better to take it up intelligently than to 
drift blindly in . . .  If the war is too strong for you to prevent, how is it going to be 
weak enough for you to mold it to your liberal purposes. 1 28 
"The crowning failure of progressivism,'' wrote historian Richard Abrams, "was 
the American role in World War I . . .  The failure in progressivism lies not in the decision 
to intervene but in the futility of intervention measured by progressive expectations." 1 29 It 
was not Dewey' s  finest hour and it ought to be acknowledged as such. Dewey was swept 
up in enthusiasm for war in a way that seemed incomprehensible to many of his admirers. 
To his credit, Dewey' s  struggle with the realities of war and the rise of hyper-patriotism 
at home led to his reassessment of just what war meant. War is the means towards some 
end, but that end is always destruction. There may be, there are occasions when 
destruction is warranted. Destruction then becomes the means to some other end, just as 
Dewey taught in countless other situations. But he wasn' t  clearheaded enough to see it in 
1 9 1 5 . Maybe that says less about John Dewey then it says about war itself. 
Lippmann was also terribly disappointed about the course of the war. Lippmann 
had come to the attention of Colonel Edward House, Woodrow Wilson 's  closest advisor, 
through the New Republic's editorial stance and Lippmann' s  The Stakes of Diplomacy 
127 Randolph Bourne, "John Dewey's Philosophy," New Republic, March 13 ,  1915 ,  5 .  128 Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," in The World of Randolph Bourne, ed. Lillian Schlissel (New 
York: Dutton, 1965), 1 3 1 .  129 Abrams, "The Failure of Progressivism," 223. 
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( 1915), his first book concerning foreign policy. 1 30 On American entry into the war, 
House facilitated Lippmann' s  appointment to a secret team known as the Inquiry. The 
task of the Inquiry was plan for post-war Europe. Lippmann was also responsible for a 
great deal of President Wilson 's  Fourteen Points. In the spring of 19 18  Lippmann went 
to London to conduct intelligence and arrange for the dissemination of propaganda. 
Lippmann was profoundly impressed by how easily public opinion could be molded. 
Disillusioned by the course of negotiations in Paris after the war, Lippmann returned to 
the United States. 1 3 1 
The war for democracy had been won. "The American people began the war with 
a single purpose - to defeat German," wrote historian William E. Leuchtenburg, "but 
during the next few months they were promised a millennium, and when the ultimate 
disenchantment followed, they turned away from the idea of world responsibility." 1 32 
Wilson, seeing himself as the only spokesman for those who really wanted peace, had 
gone to Paris to negotiate the peace. His greatest victory came when the Peace 
Conference incorporated the League of Nations into the peace treaty. But Wilson was 
unable to rouse enough support to overcome the opposition of senate Republicans and the 
United States never joined the League. In the midst of his campaign for the League, 
130 Walter Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1 9 15) .  One of the 
criticisms of Lippmann was that he never settled on a consistent political philosophy. But to a remarkable 
degree (with the not insignificant period before WWI) Lippmann's ideas regarding foreign policy remained 
very similar to those he expressed in 1 9 1 5 .  For a discussion of Lippmann's inconsistent political theory see 
Benjamin Wright, 5 Public Philosophies of Walter Lippmann (Austin: University of Texas, 1973) .  
13 1 Steel, "Walter Lippmann," 1 78 .  
132 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1 914-1932, 47. 
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Wilson suffered a stroke. The country was ruled by "a regency headed by his wife" from 
October 19 19  to March 192 1 . 1 33 
World War I marked the first time large scale governmental control of the 
American economy was attempted. Business leaders and public administrators worked 
together to manage the economy and the inescapable conclusion was that it worked. 1 34 
The amalgamation of government agencies that managed the wartime economy during 
World War I served as models for similar efforts during the New Deal and World War 
II. 1 35 The success of the war effort seemed to prove that an efficient state had developed 
in the Progressive Era, employing the kind of intelligent control that both Lippmann and 
Dewey had advocated. But those promising activities "all stopped with breathtaking 
speed after the Armistice on November 1 1 , 1 9 18." 1 36 The decision to terminate almost 
all of the federal administrative programs rested with Wilson, who from the beginning of 
the war had been concerned with those programs, not because he believed war would 
militarize the nation, but because he feared it would "corporatize it." 1 37 
In 19 19  a series of dramatic strikes broke out. Police struck in Boston, 
steelworkers and coal miners walked off the job and serious questions about the ultimate 
loyalties of worker were raised. In the spring of 1 9 1 9  violence erupted across the country. 
In June bombs exploded in eight cities in an apparently coordinated attack. By autumn, 
millions of Americans believed revolution was imminent. In November 1 9 1 9, Attorney 
133 Ibid., 6 1 .  
134 Ibid. ,  40. 
135 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1 995), 177 .  
1 36 Eric Rauchway, Blessed among Nations: How the World Made America (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2006) , 150. 
1 37 Ibid. , . 1 52. 
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General Mitchell, initiated raids on purported anarchists and radicals. Agents invaded 
private homes, union headquarters, and meeting halls. Many were arrested, few were 
convicted, some were deported. By the end of 1920, the Red Scare was over. 
Americans were tired of Progressive reformers, demands for selflessness and self-
sacrifice. The war, the League of Nations debate, the Red Scare all seemed to be an 
extension of the "political intensity" of the Progressive era and America had had 
enough. 1 38 The economy was on the upswing; there was a general sense of material 
content, life was "infused with benevolent materialism."1 39 Instead of Progressive reform, 
the middle class was finding fulfillment in the "flowering of American enterprise." 140 
"What happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920' s?" asked historian Arthur 
Link. 14 1  Link claimed that Progressivism was really a shifting alliance of "many 
progressive movements ." Central to Link' s  argument was his contention that the 
disintegration of Progressivism was hastened by the absence of any effective leadership. 
In particular, Pi:ogressivism' s  intellectual heroes abandoned the movement after World 
War I. Without identifying those he was indicting, Link went so far as to argue that 
"more than a simple desertion was involved here; it was often a matter of a cynical 
repudiation of the ideals from which progressivism derived its strength." 142 
For whatever reason, "Progressivism of the Twenties," wrote historian Eric Goldman, 
"was a beaten army, muscles aching, its ranks seriously depleted." 143 
1 38 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932, 8 1 .  
1 39 Ibid., 8 .  
140 Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's? . "  
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid.: 844. 143 Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform, 203 . 
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The presidential election of 1920 was a "national disavowal" of the ideas for 
which Wilson stood. "We have tom up Wilsonism by the roots," said Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge. Warren Harding, who had been chosen by Republican Party professionals, 
won the election by capitalizing on feelings of nostalgia for the years before the war, 
without demanding that any sacrifices be made. 144 Politics no longer demanded the 
public ' s  attention as it once had. Voter turnout continued to fall to less than fifty percent 
in 1 920. 1 45 Harding was not equipped to be president and his administration was a 
succession of scandals .  He died in August 1923 and Calvin Coolidge became president. 
Coolidge came along at the right time for a nation disgusted by the revelations of the 
Harding administration. Coolidge "summoned up images of the democracy of New 
England town meeting." 146 He served the needs of big business and the Old Guard of the 
Republican Party better than even Harding had. "Never before, here or anywhere else," 
wrote the Wall Street Journal, "has a government so completely fused with 
govemment." 147 
One year after the Armistice, Walter Lippmann took the opportunity to assess 
America' s condition. His essay in the New Republic set the stage for his dialogue with 
Dewey. America was once again drifting. American leaders were too "absent-minded to 
behave like a government." Labor unrest and the fear of an "imaginary revolution" 
144 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932, 88. 145 Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 1 5 1 .  Foner 
includes the enfranchisement of women by the 19th Amendment as one of the reasons for the decline, 
"women voted in lower numbers." But political scientist Paul Kleppner argues that sophisticated statistical 
analysis establishes that the decline cannot be attributed to women getting the vote. Paul Kleppner, "Were 
Woment to Blame? Female Suffrage and Voter Turnout, " Journal of Interdisciplinary History XII, no. 4 
( 1982). 146 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1 914-1932, 95. 147 Ibid., 103. 
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gripped Americans in "hallucination."148 Freedom of speech and of the press was in 
danger and it wasn't  just the public at large guilty of "this grotesque performance." 
Universities, the Congress, every government department, every newspaper office were 
"stocked with men who are in mortal terror." America was in a panic because its leaders 
had not developed policy to organize the nation after the war; even more egregious was 
the failure of the press .  The public was left imagining facts because the press was 
performing so poorly. "The news system being what it is, and education being where it is, 
it is possible to fool most of the public a good part of the time." Still, Lippmann had hope 
in the public, at least that portion of it that "with all their limitations, are looking for the 
truth."1 49 
Lippmann' s  Liberty and the News was published in 1920. It is the first of the texts 
that constitute the dialogue between Dewey and Lippmann. In 1922, Lippmann ' s  Public 
Opinion appeared and in 1925 its sequel, The Phantom Public was published. Taken 
together, they constitute what historian Christopher Lasch called the "most sobering 
assessment of the American public ' s  incapacity for critical judgment and self-
government" ever written. 150 
John Dewey reviewed Public Opinion and The Phantom Public praising both for 
their analysis of the problems in American democracy. Public Opinion, he wrote, was a 
work that made an "inestimable contribution" to the practice of American politics. 
Dewey was even more impressed by The Phantom Public than he had been by Public 
148 Walter Lippmann, "Unrest, " The New Republic, November 12,  1919, 3 1 8-19 .  
149 Ibid., 3 19.  15° Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1991) ,  363. 
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Opinion. 151 While he praised Lippmann ' s  diagnosis, he expressed doubts about the cure 
l)e proposed. In January 1926, John Dewey presented a series of lectures at Kenyon 
College in which he addressed the issues raised by Lippmann. The Public and Its 
Problems, published in 1 927, was based on those talks. Dewey noted Lippmann' s  
contribution: "To [The Phantom Public] as well as to his Public Opinion, I wish to 
acknowledge my indebtedness . . .  for ideas involved in my entire discussion even when it 
reaches conclusion diverging from his." 152 As historian and philosopher James Gouinlock 
has written, "The Public and Its Problems is the culmination of Dewey' s  
instrumentalism . . .  a proposal for the actual realization of intelligent conduct in practical 
life." 1 53 
In the course of their dialogue, both men displayed the essential elements of their 
philosophic make-up. Lippmann: republican, skeptical, with a constricted view of the 
capacity of the public. Dewey: democrat, pragmatic, expansive about the promise of 
democracy. Also evident was the character they had developed as young men. Dewey, 
sensitive to "the inward laceration," sought some way to create a democratic community. 
Lippmann, searching for order, tried to provide an accurate assessment of democracy 's  
limitations. 
"So long," Lippmann wrote in Liberty and the News ( 1920), "as there is 
interposed between the ordinary citizen and the facts a news organization determining by 
entirely private and unexamined standards, no matter how lofty, what he shall know, and 
151 John Dewey, "Practical Democracy, "  New Republic 45 ( 1925): 213-20. 
152John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1927); (reprint, 1954. Athens Ohio: Swallow Press/Ohio 
University Press), fn 116- 17. 
1 53 James Gouinlock, "Introduction," in John Dewey: The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois UP, 1984), xxiii. 
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hence what he shall believe, no one will be able to say that the substance of democratic 
government is secure."1 54 What made that predicament particularly dangerous was that 
journalists were "confused." American newspapermen acted under the theory that "an 
abstraction like the truth and a grace like fairness must be sacrificed whenever anyone 
thinks the necessities of civilization require the sacrifice." 155 Lippmann ' s  point was that 
reporters had decided what the national interest was and they were willing to shape the 
news to promote that cause. They did this notwithstanding the fact that they were 
"critically aware" that their conception of the national interest was "special to their age, 
their locality, their interests, and their limited knowledge." 156 Given both the economic 
and professional limitations of the practice of journalism, news "comes [to us] helter-
skelter." That would be fine for a baseball score, a transatlantic flight, or the death of a 
monarch. But where the story is more complex, "as for example, in the matter of a 
success of a policy or the social conditions among a foreign people - where the real 
answer is  neither yes or no, but subtle and a matter of balanced evidence," then 
journalism "causes no end of derangement, misunderstanding and even 
misinterpretation." 157 
Two years later Lippmann had decided that journalism, as defective as it was, was 
not entirely to blame for the problems of American democracy. He had come to 
understand that there was a critical problem in the way citizens absorbed information. 
Lippmann had learned that in wartime symbolic imagery dominated life. It was a time 
when "fear, pungency, and hatred have secured complete dominion of the spirit" and an 
154 Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 1 0. 
155 Ibid., 12 .  
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid., 38-4 1 .  
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entire population had but one picture of the enemy and of themselves. His alarm 
originated in the ease with which public opinion could be manipulated. Lippmann was 
certain that only by understanding what people thought they knew about events would it 
be possible to understand why they acted the way they did. Actions originated in 
irrational beliefs, on violent and instinctive responses to facts colored by creative 
imaginations. People responded as energetically to fiction as they did to reality. 
Citizens were not in any real sense in direct contact with their environment. 
Between man and his environment stood a "pseudo-environment" composed partly of 
fictions and partly of representations made by man himself from incomplete information 
("the pictures in our heads"). The actual environment was "too big, too complex, and too 
fleeting for direct acquaintance." Lippmann was concerned with the "spectacle of men 
acting upon their environment moved by stimuli from their pseudo-environments ." Since 
man ' s  behavior occurs in the real world, acting on the basis of stimuli from the pseudo-
environment was certain to lead to surprise and disappointment, one of Lippmann's  
perpetual concems. 1 58  
To make sense of events, men and women utilized "stereotypes" to organize their 
worlds. Lippmann argued that the public was able to see only a small portion of what 
went on in the world, though opinions covered more territory than could be directly 
observed. "The facts we see depend on where we are placed and the habits of our eyes ." 
He recognized John Dewey' s  insight in his How We Think ( 19 10) for the proposition that 
in order to deal with the world we needed to introduce definiteness and distinction, 
consistency and stability before we could make sense of the world. "We define first and 
158 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1 922), 14-16.  
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then see."1 59 Stereotypes came from moral codes and social philosophies. The process of 
Americanization, for instance, was the substitution of American stereotypes for European 
stereotypes. 1 60 Recognizable signs from our environment were chosen and filled in using 
a stocks of images. There was economy in this, since to see all things new and fresh 
would be exhausting. Understanding that preconceptions governed the way the world was 
perceived would bring positive benefits : 
If our philosophy tells us that each man is only a small part of the world, that his 
intelligence catches at best only phases and aspects in a coarse net of ideas, then, 
when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are stereotypes, to hold 
them lightly, to modify them gladly. We tend, also, to realize more and more 
clearly when our ideas started, how they came to us, why we accepted them. All 
useful history is antiseptic in this fashion. It enables us to know what fairy tale, 
what school book, what tradition, what novel, play, picture, phrase, planted one 
preconception in this mind, another in that mind. 16 1  
Stereotypes were not "instinctive equipment," but were socially constructed. The 
failure to apprehend that distinction led to confusion and to the fabrication of "collective 
minds, national souls, and race psychology." They acted as a defense of the status quo, 
and challenges to them seemed like "attacks on the foundation of the universe." 162 
Stereotypes existed prior to reason, imposing a certain character on perceptions before 
data was analyzed by intelligence. 1 63 Patterns of stereotypes determined what facts were 
seen and what was seen in them. Only by recognizing that opinions rested on "partial 
expression seen through our stereotypes" would America ever become tolerant of those 
who did not see the world as we did. 1 64 
1 59 Ibid. ,  80-8 1 .  
160 Ibid., 85.  
161 Ibid., 90-9 1 .  162 Ibid., 95 . 
163 Ibid., 98.  
164 Ibid., 159. 
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One of the foremost American stereotypes in Lippmann' s  scheme was that of the 
inexorable march of progress. "The American version of progress has fitted an 
extraordinary range of facts in the economic situation and in human nature."1 65 Belief in 
progress as automatic had blinded Americans. A stereotype like progress took on a 
momentum of its own and limited America to employing superficial responses to 
problems. Progressives advocated programs, butnot how they were to be implemented. 
(Lippmann had done just that in Drift and Mastery) Laissez faire economics assumed the 
economy went on under its own power. 1 66 Americans saw progress and success in 
everything American; "We read back into the qualities that are presupposed in the 
stereotypes." 167 
Political campaigns used language, imagery, vagueness,  and tropes to invoke 
stereotypes. "A leader or an interest that can make itself master of current symbols is 
master of the current situation."1 68 Because knowledge was limited, "we choose between 
trustworthy and untrustworthy reporters." The public couldn't  be everywhere at all times. 
Many citizens relied only on vague reports about what was going on in the world. Access 
to information was dependent on income levels, others lacked curiosity. He argued that 
women in particular were often restricted in the kind of information they received by the 
social set to which they were born. "The Negroes and the foreign element" developed 
their own social hierarchies that controlled information within those groups.  The 
individuals entrusted to act on behalf of governments, schools, newspapers, and churches 
were subject to the same limitations. Therefore, those jnstitutions were unable to do much 
165 Ibid. 166 Ibid., 1 1 3 .  167 Ibid., 1 1 6. 168 Ibid., 207. 
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about "the more obvious failings of democracy, against violent prejudice, apathy, and 
preference for the trivial as against the hunger for sideshows and three legged calves." 169 
"The nation finds itself in the face of aggravated problems without any source of 
information that it can really trust." So the public was left to process tainted data using 
defective reasoning. It meant that public opinion was built upon indirect, unseen and 
puzzling information about which no certain conclusions could be made. Lippmann' s  
contention was that democracy had never been considered i n  light of the distance 
between images in people' s  minds and what went on outside their minds. For Lippmann, 
the dilemma only heightened the danger of expecting the public to be able to evaluate the 
kinds of issues before them. He held out little hope that education could solve the 
problem. For one thing, educators suffered from the same disability as all other citizens. 
And for another, "education is  a matter of years, the emergency a matter of hours." If 
education was merely going to reinforce the way things had always been done, nothing 
would change. Lippmann claimed education was ineffective in creating an engaged 
citizenry because all it did was reinforce traditional attitudes. Dealing with the modern 
world required more than simply teaching "morals ,  manners and patriotism."1 70 
If political science could develop new ways to inquire about the world, perhaps education 
might be of some help. It might teach how to properly assess the basis of information, or 
about the proper use of history, or to recognize the source of attitudes and stereotypes.  
Then it might be possible that "the enormous, censoring, stereotyping, and dramatizing 
apparatus can be liquidated."1 7 1  
169 Ibid. ,  365. 
1 70 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), 28 .  
171 Lippmann, Public Opinion, 407-08. 
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In his review of Public Opinion John Dewey noted that he was particularly 
impressed by Lippmann' s  analysis of the problem of knowledge. It was a "more 
significant statement than professional epistemological philosophers have managed to 
give." 1 72 But Dewey thought that Lippmann "surrendered the case for the press to 
easily," a piquant criticism of one who made his living as an editor and journalist. There 
was in Dewey' s  mind a hope that the press could be reformed and that it might get past 
the sensational to doing the task it ought to be engaged, "treating news events in the light 
of a continuing study and record of underlying conditions."173 
Lippmann argued there was another problem in addition to the epistomolgic 
dilemma. Americans were too busy struggling with their own lives to be able to gather 
and digest the data necessary to make the kinds of decisions required of an 
"omnicompetent" citizen. There was no one in Lippmann' s  experience who approached 
the ideal of the "sovereign and omnicompetent citizen," an individual expected to possess 
an "unlimited quantity of public spirit, interest, curiosity and effort." 1 74 "We are 
concerned with public affairs," he wrote, "but immersed in our private lives ." Time and 
attention were limited. 1 75 Little time was spent on reading newspapers . Urban dwellers 
had to cope with a "bath of noise." 176 The private citizen is something like a "deaf 
spectator" Lippmann wrote, only recalling that he is affected by public affairs by the 
intrusion of rules and regulations, taxes, and the occasional war. Public affairs were 
172 Dewey, "Public Opinion, "  339. Some thirty-five years earlier Dewey had himself been involved in a 
project with Franklin Ford and Robert Park intended to produce just such a paper, "Thought News." The 
paper was never published and the project ended in "distressing" circumstances to Dewey. See Westbrook, 
John Dewey and American Democracy, 56-58. 
173 Dewey, "Public Opinion," 341 .  
1 74 Lippmann, The Phantom Public, 22. 1 75 Lippmann, Public Opinion, 57.  176 Ibid., 72. 
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invisible, managed in far off places, controlled by unfamiliar powers . 1 77 The citizen was 
poorly informed, "he lives in a world which he cannot see, does not understand and is 
unable to direct. In the cold light of experience he knows that his sovereignty is a fiction. 
H . . h b . f h d " 178 e reigns m t  eory, ut m act e oes not govern. 
Dewey agreed that the citizen was misunderstood, but he had a different 
explanation, one that relied on the most basic assumption of pragmatism. Dewey argued 
that individuals did not exist apart from social relations, nor did individuals possess rights 
prior to the existence of society. Dewey' s  analysis of the misapprehension of the nature 
of the individual led him to different conclusions than Lippmann. Dewey put the blame 
on a distorted liberalism that was in fact a philosophy of individualism. Dewey worked 
from the origins of the United States. Instead of recognizing the contingent nature of the 
American state, liberals now imagined democracy came from "some inalienable sacred 
authority resident in protesting individuals." John Locke had prominently argued that 
non-political rights were part of the very nature of the individual and that the proper role 
of government was limited to the protection of those rights. 179 This account of 
individualism was eventually supported by the study of economics as that discipline soon 
claimed to be the study of natural laws. Economics became entwined with politics. 
"Proof' that economics was based on a system of natural laws served to support the same 
kind of claims about politics. It was a small step to the assertion that the sole purpose of 
government was to protect economic interests. 1 80 This was an argument Dewey had 
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made before, but the pro-business orientation of the administration in Washington only 
served to reinforce his point. 
Changes in material conditions resulted in a "release of human potentialities 
previously dormant." What may have been unsettling to the community was "liberating 
with respect to single persons." Individuals found themselves freed from old habits, 
regulations, and institutions. Individualism and democracy developed side by side. 
Voting and majority rule were portrayed as the acts of individuals "in their untrammeled 
individual sovereignty." 1 8 1 But industrialization had ushered in a "new era of human 
relationships." 1 82 Democratic political theory was built on a conception of independent, 
self-motivated individuals, but what existed now were "standardized interchangeable 
units." 1 83 Liberalism joined the mythology of an isolated individual possessing a "ready-
made faculty of foresight and prudent calculation" with the doctrine of individuals 
possessing antecedent natural rights. 1 84 To Dewey this was rank nonsense. Classic 
liberalism failed to recognize that the "underlying and generative conditions of concrete 
behavior are social as well as organic."1 85 Dewey' s conclusion regarding the "problem of 
the public" was that the same forces which had created the forms of democratic 
government had also brought about "conditions which halt the social and humane ideals 
that demand the utilization of government as the genuine instrumentality of an inclusive 
1 8 1  Ibid. , 99- 1 00. 182 Ibid., 96. 183 Ibid., 1 07 .  184 Ibid. , 102. 185 Ibid., 103. 
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and fraternally associated public." America had no political institutions worthy of it and 
as a result the democratic public remained inchoate and unorganized. 1 86 
Both men attempted to describe what the "public" really was and was not. 
Lippmann claimed that theories regarding popular government were based on the 
conception that "there is a public which directs the course of events." But in reality the 
pubic was a "mere phantom." The public was not a fixed body, but rather consisted of 
those persons who were interested in a particular affair at a particular time and could 
affect it by supporting or rejecting the participants in that affair. "An opinion of the right 
and the wrong, the good and the bad, the pleasant and unpleasant is dated, is localized, is 
relative. It applies only to some men in some place under some circumstances ." 1 87 Private 
interests and relative values rarely merged into a common interest. The best that could be 
hoped for was an "accommodation of purpose," something tantamount to balance of 
power politics. 1 88 Conventional theory treated the public as if it were an organism, one 
person with an organic unity. Liberalism' s treatment of the public as an organic 
individual created profound confusion that could be eliminated only by recognizing that 
"it i s  the individual who acts, not society; it is the individual who thinks, not the 
collective mind; it is the painter who paints, not the artistic spirit of the age; it is the 
soldiers who fight and are killed, not the nation." 1 89 It was individuals interacting with 
each other that constituted the public. 
Lippmann believed that liberalism had demonstrated that man was part of the 
natural world and that idea and custom were "bounded by time and space and 
186 Ibid., 1 09. 187 Lippmann, The Phantom Public, 97. 188 Ibid. ,  108. 1 89 Ibid., 172. 
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circumstances" and that all opinion had a bias and the holders of those opinions could 
only see the world from their vantage point, from their stereotypical perspective. 1 90 
However, liberalism could never figure out what to do with this insight as it tried to 
fashion a coherent public . The liberal approach was to try to tame and enlighten 
individual interests and somehow have them fit together. But liberalism offered no way 
of overcoming individual interests . It made appeals to fairness;  it provided a "weapon of 
releas,e, but not a way of life." Liberalism consistently misjudged the capacity of the 
public because it "assumed that all mankind was within hearing; that all mankind when it 
heard would respond homogenously because it had a single soul ." The liberal appeal to 
the virtue in everybody "was equivalent to an appeal to nobody."1 9 1  The appeal to a sense 
of civic virtue could only be effective if made to actual individuals .  Instead, liberalism 
"attempted to eliminate the hero entirely." 192 Other theories of political and social order -
here Lippmann invoked Plato, Dante, Hamilton, Bismarck and Lenin - appealed to real 
people in contrast to the "vague unworldliness" of liberalism. Liberalism's appeals 
instead were "escapes from particular purposes into some universal purpose . . .  a flight 
from the human problem."1 93 
Dewey argued that American democracy had developed out of "genuine 
community life" in stable locales. The founders attempted to create a government 
appropriate for a "congeries of self governing communities ." What Dewey' s  age 
inherited then, were ideals and practices designed for local town meetings modified 
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h h d h · · · 1 94 A A . d 1 d d d d t roug a oc improv1sat10ns .  s menca eve ope an expan e , new 
circumstances demanded "mobile and fluctuating associational forms." Americans kept 
moving. "How can a public," Dewey asked, "be organized when it literally does not stay 
in place?"1 95 Despite itself, and the lack of intelligent planning, America had achieved 
some measure of political unity. The cost of national unity, however, was a lost and 
bewildered public. As Lippmann had argued in A Preface to Politics twenty years earlier, 
Dewey saw declining participation in elections as an indicator of the public ' s  uncertainty. 
Factions, "extra-legal agencies," and intermediary groups gained power. Citizens were 
reduced to voting for unknown candidates, chosen by political machines. The public was 
so "confused and eclipsed" that it was unable to grasp the mechanisms of government 
ostensibly established for their use. Transformations in material and social relations had 
so complicated matters that the public "cannot identify and distinguish itself." 1 96 
Because the public was so disorganized, their representatives had little reason to respond 
to social problems, which only amplified indifference and apathy. 1 97 
Dewey went on to analyze the nature of the state. His emphasis was on the need 
to understand the state as malleable, not an institution based on eternal principles. The 
distinction between what was a public issue and what was private concern turned on an 
analysis of the "scope of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need 
control, whether by inhibition or promotion."1 98 The public consisted of those affected by 
the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it was "deemed necessary 
194 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, 1 1 2.  
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to have those consequences systematically cared for." 199 "The state" Dewey claimed, "is 
the organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of the interests 
shared by it members."  Because in no two ages or places did the same public exist, there 
could be no "best" state. The formation of the state ought to be an experimental process . 
As times changed so would the state; it must always be "rediscovered."200 It was the job 
of political and social science to devise methods for determining appropriate forms of the 
political system. Belief in the sanctity of one system over another served was a barrier "to 
orderly and directed change, an invitation to revolution."201 
There would be no need for political organization if interactions were limited to 
immediate face to face encounters in which consequences were "direct and vital ." In a 
neighborhood where each person knew the other, the state would be "an impertinence."202 
But industry and technology had altered forms of existing association. New material 
conditions led to the formation of new publics, though those publics had no effective 
recourse to political institutions because those institutions "persist of their momentum." 
Old political structures had to be re-formed by the public itself. Successful political 
organization could only be achieved through the "use of intelligence to judge 
consequences."203 Activities once thought of as private became public; others once public 
became private.204 The line between what public and private "has to be discovered 
experimentally." It changed over time. "To suppose that an a priori conception of the 
intrinsic nature and limits of the individual on one side and the state on the other will 
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yield good results once and for all is absurd."205 Dewey was arguing for at least the 
possibility of state intervention in the economy, something that had been successful 
during the war. 
The public established "dikes and channels" to confine actions within prescribed 
limits but their form did not come from a "general will" or any antecedent cause. Belief 
that laws came from other sources than human agency inevitably led to replacement of 
law with force.206 Law was the structure which canalized action, intended to make 
consequences predictable. Dewey went so far as to say that the nature of consequences 
was "indifferent," what mattered was being able to predict consequences .207 A public 
organized as a state would have an interest in utilizing state apparatus to equalize 
conditions. The dependent and helpless would become wards of the public . The state 
would be involved in improving education and working conditions, establishing social 
insurance, instituting a minimum wage 
There was nothing perplexing or even discouraging in the "spectacle of the 
stupidity and errors of political behavior." The state was as its officials were. Only 
through constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials could citizens maintain the 
integrity and usefulness of a state.208 The measure of a state' s  effectiveness was how 
well it relieved individuals from the "waste of negative struggle and needless conflict and 
confers upon him positive assurance and reinforcement in what he undertakes ."209 In the 
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end, Dewey insisted, the state was to be judged by the consequences of its actions;  it was 
no more sacred than any other institution. 2 10  
Lippmann claimed that the while the judgments of groups were often more 
coherent than those proffered by individuals, groups could do nothing more than assent or 
dissent to some proposition put before them2 1 1  No group ever cooperated in any complex 
affair without some kind of central organization managed by a smaller cadre of people. 
Advocates of direct democracy, as many of the Progressives had been, hypothesized 
creative cooperation between self-sufficient individuals. But policies never developed 
spontaneously in the "mind" of the public.2 1 2  The contrast between men acting 
individually and as a public had been misunderstood. The fundamental difference was 
"between men doing specific things and men attempting to command general results ."21 3 
What the public could do was approve of something which had to be done, or assent to 
some proposal, "but they cannot create, administer and actually perform the act they have 
in mind."2 14 The public could never be a part of the realm of executive acts. It would 
always be confined to the role of controlling actions of others from the outside. The only 
way the public had any influence was by influencing an actor in an affair, which meant 
that the public had a secondary, indirect relationship to events .  Public opinion was not a 
force "directing society to clearly conceived ends."2 1 5  Only during a crisis did public 
opinion mean anything at all. In a crisis the public would align "in such a way as to favor 
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the action of those individuals who may be able to compose the crisis."2 16  But even here, 
public opinion could only have an effect after "somebody" challenged the arbitrary power 
first. Otherwise the public "can do nothing but meddle ignorantly or tyrannically."2 17  
Perhaps Lippmann' s  most striking claim was that what appeared to be public 
consent to policy was, in fact, manufactured consent. No longer were the people 
sovereign, the purveyors of information had assumed that position. Techniques of 
persuasion had been revolutionized: "It is no longer possible to believe in the original 
dogma of democracy: that the knowledge needed for management of human affairs 
comes from the human heart."2 1 8  It was only a fiction concocted by political theorists, 
Lippmann argued, that the functioning of government could ever be identified with the 
will of the people. 
Democratic theory ignored the fact that "people are fooled, that they do not 
always know their own interests, and that all men are not equally fitted to govern."219  The 
political science on which democracy rested "assumed the art of government to be a 
natural endowment." Jefferson believed the yeoman farmer possessed innately the 
requisite qualities to participate in politics and at times even suggested the capacity to 
govern rested in all the people (at least white people). Even someone like Alexander 
Hamilton who had little faith in "the people," believed landholders, merchants and 
professionals owned an instinct to govern.220 To Lippmann all of this was dangerously 
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absurd. What made it even more pernicious was that these "natural" rulers governed on 
the basis of information that was incomplete.221 
If democracy were ever to exist as a spontaneous affair as Jefferson imagined it, 
the interests of democracy would have had to remain simple and easily managed, the 
environment within the range of every man ' s  "direct and certain knowledge."222 This 
much Dewey could agree with. Trouble came when that democratic vision was applied to 
the modem world, because the idealized citizen, competent to deal with public affairs, 
selflessly concerned with the course of public affairs, consistently public spirited, was 
nowhere to be found. The result was a bewildered public. Lippmann claimed (not very 
convincingly) that his argument was not about "congenital differences between the 
masterful few and ignorant many."223 It was rather a matter of where men were placed in 
relation to essential knowledge. Aristocrats and democrats made the same mistake; they 
failed to acknowledge that "competence exists only in relation to function."224 
But, and this was the crux of Lippmann' s  argument, it had never been proven that 
a "public opinion" actually existed which could effectively be applied to any democratic 
mechanism. It was folly to believe that every citizen wanted to or was competent to 
participate actively in government. If the voter could not master the details of political 
i ssues because he did not have the time, the interest, or the knowledge, he would not have 
a more informed public opinion simply because he was asked to express his opinion more 
often. Instead, the voter would be more bewildered, more bored and more ready to go 
along uncritically: 
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These various remedies, eugenic, educational, ethical, populist and socialist all 
assume that either the voters are inherently competent to direct the course of 
affairs or that they are making progress toward such an ideal. I think it is a false 
ideal. I do not mean an undesirable ideal. I mean an unattainable ideal, bad only in 
the sense that it is bad for a fat man to try to be a ballet dancer. An ideal should 
express the true possibilities of its subject. When it does not it perverts the true 
possibilities. The ideal of the omnicompetent, sovereign citizen is, in my opinion 
such a false ideal. It is unattainable. The pursuit of it is misleading. The failure to 
achieve it has produced the current disenchantment.225 
Problems that might have been solvable became intractable precisely because the public 
exerted its force. What was left for the public in Lippmann' s  scheme was the 
determination of whether actors in a given controversy followed appropriate rules or 
sought to satisfy their own arbitrary desires.226 Political scientists could devise methods 
of judging whether the rules were followed. Civic education could inform the public 
about the methods political scientists had developed.227 That was it. "When we 
remember,' '  Lippmann wrote, "that the public consists of busy men reading newspapers 
for half an hour or so a day" the prudent course of action was for the public not to get 
involved in political issues at all. 228 
Lippmann' s  way out of the dilemma was reliance on experts. He argued that 
reliance on experts was not evidence of "sheep-like nature."229 It would be important to 
consult a number of experts and they ought to be forced to answer to each other. 230 
Lippmann did not have much to offer as to how one expert might be chosen over another. 
It was a question "we need not try to enter,'' though Lippmann, curiously enough, seemed 
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to feel the answer could be found in psychoanalysis.23 1 He did not question the need to 
publicly air the recommendations proposed by experts, but he thought it preposterous that 
their deliberations would be comprehensible or even of interest to many citizens. 
Dewey' s response was to consider whether management of political institutions 
by experts would advance the cause of democracy. Non-political activities were all 
directed by specialists, yet the political realm resisted their influence. Most public 
concerns were technical matters : sanitation, public health, housing, city planning, 
regulation and distribution of immigrants. Solutions to those kinds of problems could 
only be achieved by factual inquiry, something other than counting votes.232 But Dewey 
was adamantly opposed to Lippmann' s  proposal. Rule by experts was a "revival of the 
Platonic notion that philosophers should be kings,'' though experts had replaced 
philosophers because "philosophy has become something of a joke."233 A cynic, Dewey 
observed, might think that the whole expert plan was a "reverie entertained by the 
intellectual class in compensation for an impotence." If the masses were indeed 
"intellectually irredeemable" as claimed, possessed of both "too many desires and too 
much power,'' they weren't going to permit rule by experts anyway. Their very ostensible 
infirmities -- "ignorance, bias, frivolity, jealousy, instability"-- made them unlikely 
candidates for passive submission to rule by intellectuals ;  "rule by an economic class 
may be disguised from the masses; rule by experts could not be covered up."234 
Dewey believed that expertise was appropriate in administration of narrowly 
framed issues where general policy was already established. However, if experts shut 
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themselves off from the public as they became a separate class, they would be "shut off 
from the knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve."235 Popular 
government served to educate in that it "forces a recognition that there are common 
interests, even though the recognition of what they are is confused." Segregating a class 
of experts would inevitably remove them from deliberation with the public. The expert 
class would become "a class with private interests and private knowledge, which in social 
matters is not knowledge at all ."  No government by experts in which the "masses do not 
have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy 
managed in the interests of the few." 
There was a role for experts though. "The essential need . .  . is the improvement of 
the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is  the problem of 
the public ." Inquiry was something at which experts were most competent. Their 
expertise was not in framing policy, but in discovery and publication of the facts upon 
which inquiry depends. Once the facts were identified, would the public have the 
intelligence to make the appropriate judgments? The talent required to make decisions of 
that type were exaggerated in Dewey' s  estimation. Until propaganda and secrecy were 
replaced by inquiry, "We have no way of telling how apt for judgment of social policies 
the existing intelligence of the masses may be." Further, effective intelligence, was not an 
"original innate endowment. '. ' Rather, effective intelligence was dependent upon "the 
education which social conditions effect."236 Dewey envisioned a general rise in the level 
of intelligence resulting from a more enlightened state of social affairs, "the notion that 
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intelligence is  a personal endowment or personal attainment is the great conceit of the 
intellectual class."237 
Lippmann understood that there were those who argued "the cure for the evils of 
democracy is more democracy," that all would be solved if only the popular will could be 
focused and determined because the will of the people was wise and beneficent. It would 
not work. Technical solutions, the sort Progressives had proposed - extensions of 
suffrage, initiatives, referendums, recalls, direct primaries, elected judiciary - would be 
no more effective.238 Lippmann knew his understanding of democracy differed radically 
from those of active reformers who believed that the voter ought to be treated as a 
"responsible man." Perhaps he had Dewey in mind: 
It was believed that if only he could be taught more facts, if only he would take 
more interest, if only he would read more and better newspapers, if only he would 
listen to more lectures and read more reports, he would gradually be trained to 
direct public affairs. The whole assumption is false. It rests upon a false 
conception of public opinion and a false conception of the way the public acts. No 
sound scheme of civic education can come of it. No progress can be made toward 
this unattainable ideal.239 
To this point, the dialogue between Dewey and Lippmann had been on terrain that 
Lippmann had chosen. Dewey had worked within the framework that Lippmann 
established because he felt that Lippmann' s  challenge to American democracy had to be 
met. He considered Lippmann to be of his own "intellectual weight."240 Dewey, the 
"philosopher of democracy," knew that when Americans�thought of democracy they 
thought first of political democracy, of voting, of government, and how well it responded. 
He knew that his passionate advocacy of radical pervasive democracy would come to 
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nothing if political democracy failed. Dewey was at something of a disadvantage; his 
writing style was nothing like Lippmann' s .  A sympathetic reader of The Public and Its 
Problems called it "maddeningly obscure."241 Lippmann was a master stylist: acerbic, 
cutting, funny, relentless. 
Dewey approached the subject of political democracy as he did most everything 
else, as if it were a problem to solve, experimentally. He offered a method that might be 
useful in developing a solution to the problems of politics in the 1920s. Lippmann on the 
other hand had an answer, the answer. But it was a facile answer. It is always easier to 
say no, it cannot be done. Most everybody that has ever been in a public place and looked 
around has at one time or another said to themselves, "That 's  my peer? That is who is 
going to make decisions that will affect my life?" Maybe the answer really was no, but 
that was not something that Dewey was going to allow to go unchallenged. It must have 
been infuriating at times to read Lippmann' s  biting criticism of what Dewey had spent his 
life defending. Doubly infuriating because so much of what Lippmann wrote had the ring 
of truth. All Dewey had to do was look at the White House to see that. But to Dewey's 
credit he tried to meet Lippmann' s  thrusts without resorting to platitudes and exhortations 
of faith. Some of the time he and Lippmann were talking past each other, a measure of 
how far they had come from their days in the Progressive era. 
What is clear in their exchange is where each man believed he stood in relation to 
America. Philosopher Michael Walzer has developed a taxonomy of social criticism. One 
241 James W. Carey, "Reconceiving "Mass" And "Media"," in Communication as Culture: Essays on 
Media and Society (New York: 1988), 78 .  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said of Dewey, "He spoke as 
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sort of criticism is "disembodied." It comes from a "dispassionate stranger" or an 
"estranged native" who displays "radical detachment." That type of critic portrays 
himself as disinterested and dispassionate, "in, but not wholly of their society." The other 
type of critic is the "connected," or the "local judge."242 There is no doubt into which 
category Lippmann fit. He was the disembodied critic, a designation he would have been 
proud to bear. It was a position th:;it served him well as a journalist and advisor to the 
powerful. His distance often gave him a unique and advantageous position to make 
judgments .  But as Walzer points out, it "presses its practitioners toward manipulation and 
compulsion."243 This rings true of Lippmann too. 
Dewey belongs in the connected critic class. His life' s work was devoted to 
erasing divisions and barriers, at least the ones of which he was cognizant. There were 
times when Dewey had a surprisingly tin ear. He could be cruel and vengeful . His 
treatment of Randolph Bourne, both when Bourne was alive and after he died, was 
particularly unfortunate. But the power of his vision for America is as powerful today as 
it was eighty years ago. 
Lippmann was finished in their exchange, but Dewey had more to say about 
democracy. Dewey was on the offensive now. Lippmann had exaggerated the importance 
of politics and political action and minimized the need and the potential of educating the 
entire public in the process of democracy. "The difficulty is so fundamental ," Dewey 
wrote, "that it can be met only by a solution more fundamental than [Lippmann] has 
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dared to give." Democracy was "a word of many meanings." One meaning, and "not the 
most inspiring," was political.244 
Industrialization had created a "Great Society" distinguished by vast webs of 
impersonal relationships. Simultaneously, industrial development "invaded and 
disintegrated the small community of former times without generating a 'Great 
Community. "' Traditional political and legal forms were not competent to deal with the 
repercussions. The modem world was one where consequences were "felt rather than 
perceived . . .  suffered but not known." There were no state mechanisms to "canalize the 
streams of social action and thereby regulate them . . .  Hence the publics are amorphous 
and unarticulated." Issues were too complex and intricate. "The social situation has been 
so changed by the facts of an industrial age that traditional general principles have little 
practical meaning."245 The environment was transformed faster than the social ethos. 
Beliefs and ideals seemed "thin and wavering" because they were not in tune with actual 
conditions .  The physical tools of communication had evolved, but thoughts and 
aspirations consistent with this new age had not been created: 
Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will 
remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community. Our Babel 
is not one of tongues but of the signs and symbols without which shared 
experience is impossible.246 
Here is where Dewey diverged so sharply from Lippmann. Public opinion was formed by 
communication within a community. The sources of information mattered, but everyone 
in community life had the capacity to utilize information if it became the subject of social 
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intercourse. Dewey was proposing that conversation was the context for opinion, not 
expertise, or science owned by a privileged aristocracy. 
The democratic ideal was one that seemed at odds with the modem age. What had 
been forgotten was that democracy was richer than any formal structure. Dewey argued 
that if fully realized, democracy would affect "all modes of human association,'' the 
family, the school, industry, religion. He knew the old adage, just as Lippmann did, that 
the cure for the problems of democracy was more democracy. He rejected that nostrum, 
just as Lippmann had, if it meant only the provision of more of the same. Dewey' s 
answer was to return to the idea of democracy itself, an effort directed at "clarifying and 
deepening our apprehension of it."247 None of the machinery of democracy was sacred; 
machinery was designed to meet needs. Democracy was not itself "a mystic faith,'' not 
the gift of an "overruling providence,'' but a "well-attested conclusion from historic 
facts."248 Democracy did not develop as an immanent idea unfolding or of some world 
spirit moving towards a foreordained end. Rather it was the "outcome of a vast series of 
adaptations and responsive accommodations, each to its own particular situation."249 
He believed the general trend was towards making the interest of the public "a more 
supreme guide." The problem remained though - how was a "scattered, mobile and 
manifold public" going to find itself and express its interests? This was the first step, 
more crucial than tinkering with democratic forms. "The problem lies deeper; it is in the 
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first instance an intellectual problem: the search for conditions under which the Great 
S . b h G C . "250 oc1ety may ecome t e reat ommumty. 
What then was democracy? Viewed from the individual ' s  perspective, it was 
possession of "a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the 
activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the 
values which the groups sustain." From the perspective of the group, it demanded 
liberating the potential of members of the group consistent with the interests and goods 
which were held in common. Every individual was a member of many groups.  All were 
"enriching and enriched" by participation in family life, industry and voluntary 
associations .  Democracy was not an alternative to other forms of associated life, "It is the 
idea of community itself . . .  The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its 
implications, constitutes the idea of democracy."25 1 
The concepts associated with democracy - fraternity, liberty and equality - were 
"hopeless abstractions" unless understood in association with communal life. If not 
comprehended in that manner, equality became merely "a creed of mechanical identity" 
impossible to realize; liberty became merely "independence of social ties" ending in 
anarchy: 
[Liberty] is that secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities which 
takes place only in rich and manifold association with others; the power to be an 
individualized self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own way 
the fruits of association. Equality denotes the unhampered share which each 
individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated 
action. It is equitable because it is measured only by need and capacity to utilize, 
not by extraneous factors which deprive one in order that another may take and 
have . . .  Equali!Y does not signify that kind of mathematical or physical 
250 Ibid., 147. 251 Ibid., 148. 
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equivalence in virtue of which any one element may be substituted for another. It 
denotes effective regard for whatever is distinctive and unique in each, 
irrespective of physical and psychological inequalities. It is not a natural 
possession but is  a fruit of the community when its action is  directed by its 
character as a community.252 
Dewey recognized that associations might occur without thought, but their mere 
existence did not mean the creation of community. True community recognized desired 
ends which could only be realized through communication. Culture allowed for memory 
and foresight, for calculation and planning, for reflective thought and action which 
fostered the development of shared goals and ideals .253 It was education ' s  purpose to 
bring young people within "the traditions, outlook and interests" which characterized a 
community. "Everything which is  distinctively human is learned." Foremost of the 
lessons to be learned was "an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member 
of a community."254 
He returned to what he considered the fundamental question: "What are the 
conditions under which it is possible for the Great Society to approach more closely and 
vitally the status of a Great Community, and thus take form in genuinely democratic 
societies and state?"255 Outdated concepts had to be discarded. First among them, was the 
idea that each individual was born with the native capacity to participate in civic affairs . 
Dewey took note of Lippmann' s  "omnicompetent individual: competent to frame 
policies, to judge their results; competent to know in all situations demanding political 
action what is good for his own good, and competent to enforce his idea of good and the 
252 Ibid. ,  1 50-5 1 .  253 Ibid. ,  153.  254 Ibid., 155 .  255 Ibid., 157 .  
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will to effect it against contrary forces."256 He had no doubt that history had destroyed the 
idea that an individual was competent in all situations to know what was in his best 
interest and to know how best to achieve it. But what permits us, he asked, to assume that 
statesmen had the special knowledge required for the effective organization of a 
democratic public? Organization was a technical problem and the requisite expertise did 
not yet exist. Only through the method and spirit of science would it be possible to 
develop the appropriate skills for any member of the democratic community.257 
Properly informed public opinion required continuous and connected inquiry, "a 
thing is  fully known only when it is published, shared, socially accessible."258 There was 
room for disagreement - even if competing policy proposals were based on the same set 
of facts. But "genuinely public policy" could only be formed on the basis of knowledge 
acquired through "systematic, thorough and well-equipped search."259 Dewey' s 
complaint was that the social sciences could not publish their findings quickly enough. 
Rapid communication only promoted the dissemination of news, events that deviated 
from the norm. But the meaning of the news depended on social consequences which 
could only be determined in context.260 The days were past when government could be 
carried on without any pretense of determining public wishes. Thus "there is an enormous 
premium upon all methods which affect their formation."26 1 
Would it really matter, Dewey asked, if inquiry were perfected? Would the public 
be interested in the results? He had a surprising response. The public would be interested 
256 Ibid., 158 .  257 Ibid., 1 66. 258 Ibid., 1 76-77. 259 Ibid., 178 .  260 Ibid., 1 79-80. 261  Ibid., 1 8 1 .  
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only if the art of presentation were perfected. "The freeing of the artist in literary 
presentation . .  . i s  as much a precondition of the desirable creation of adequate opinion on 
public matters as is the freeing of social inquiry."262 Here Dewey was arguing for the 
importance of art in democracy. "The function of art has always been to break through 
the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness . . .  Artists have always been the 
real purveyors of news."263 Sharing socially available knowledge would "directly and in 
unpredictable ways" alter the working of human nature. New potentialities would be 
released; none of them predictable. 264 Education needed to be improved and scientific 
inquiry into the development of children pursued. More money needed to be spent on 
understanding the causes of mental illness and retardation. Improved techniques might 
lead to control over abnormal behavior. 265 Ultimately the substitution of experiment for 
"absolutistic logic" would mean that "no longer will views generated in view of special 
situations be frozen into absolute standards and masquerade as eternal truths."266 
Dewey was restrained regarding the chance that American democracy could be 
reformed. "In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of 
face-to-face intercourse. That is why the family and neighborhood, with all their 
deficiencies, have always been the chief agencies of nurture." The Great Community, in 
the sense of free and full communication was possible, but it could never possess all the 
qualities that marked a local community. The best that could be hoped for was that the 
larger community would be competent to order relations and enrich the experience of the 
262 Ibid., 1 83 .  263 Ibid. 264 Ibid., 197. 265 Ibid., 199. 266 Ibid., 203. 
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smaller, more localized community.267 "There is something deep within human nature 
itself which pulls toward settled relationships," Dewey wrote. "Happiness which is full of 
content and peace is found only in enduring ties with others ." He wondered if the "mania 
for motion, of fretful discontent" were only attempts at filling the vacuum left by the 
breakdown of community ties. The rise of cities, the concentration of wealth, rather than 
promoting social bonds, only abetted the "demolition of ties that form local 
communities ." He concluded that there was no way to predict either the development or 
further decline of community. One thing was certain in Dewey' s  mind, "Unless local 
communal life can be restored, the public cannot adequately resolve its most urgent 
problem: to find and identify itself." Democracy depended on it.268 
There is  something troubling about Dewey' s  nostalgic evocation of the small 
face-to-face community of some distant past. Omitted from Dewey' s  vision is any 
acknowledgement that there had always been some left out or relegated to the margins. 
Lippmann had made a point to consider the move towards fuller equality of women, 
albeit not in a completely satisfactory manner. Lippmann had at least mentioned racial 
inequity. Perhaps Dewey felt that democratic education and reorganization would 
automatically bring racial minorities into community, but if he did, he never wrote about 
it.269 His comments regarding the position of women were limited too.270 Dewey 
267 Ibid., 2 1 1 .  268 Ibid., 2 1 3- 14. 269 Dewey' s  failure to address the plight o f  African-Americans through the course o f  his life is really 
surprising. In 1 909, he gave a speech at Cooper Union in response to "The Call." That may be a testament 
to Mary White Ovington' s  persistence. Daniel Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois ' s  biographer, thinks that 
Du Bois probably wrote the speech which takes up less than two pages in Dewey's  collected works. David 
Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois - Biography of a Race, 1868-1919 (NY: Hemy Holt, 1993), 300.The 
speech was found in the archives of the NAACP, not Dewey' s  papers. Dewey never wrote of lynching or 
racial discrimination or segregation. There are virtually no mentions of race in the thirty-seven volumes of 
his Collected Works, nor in his correspondence. In 1932 he spoke at the NAACP's 23rd annual convention. 
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certainly wasn' t  a racist, but African-Americans seemed outside his purview. Nor did it 
seem he had taken account of how often those small communities demanded stifling 
conformity, an observation made that had long ago been made by Tocqueville. 
That being said, there are passages in The Public and its Problems of 
incomparably intense emotional power. There is beauty amidst the "maddeningly 
obscure." Granted, there are not many hints revealed on how to get to the "Great 
Community." But to see Dewey' s  portrait of an active, engaging, emotionally fulfilling 
democratic community next to Lippmann' s  sterile, expertly organized, republican society 
is to make the choice between them easy. Perhaps that is a judgment of the heart over the 
head. 
There were only limited interactions between the two men after 1926. In 1930, 
Dewey wrote to Lippmann: 
It was very good of you to write me about my last book. On the whole, I find 
more satisfaction, and certainly consolation, in the comments of those who, like 
yourself, are not engaged in the work of philosophy professionally, than I do from 
the reactions of some, at least, of my colleagues.27 1 
He minimized the role of racism and instead ascribed discrimination to economic considerations. In the 
months prior to the convention, Du Bois had written Dewey four letters asking him to write something for 
the The Crisis, but Dewey only responded to the last. Unfortunately Dewey' s  response has never been 
located. Du Bois responded to the last, saying that he understood and invited Dewey to respond whenever 
he could. That Du Bois persisted says something I suppose. (Dewey's papers are housed at the Center for 
Dewy Studies at Southern Illinois University.) 
· 
270 Dewey's relationship with Jane Addams was one of the most important of his life. To his credit, he 
treated Addams as he would any of the other intellectual giants he was acquainted with. It does not seem to 
me that her influence on him did not have much to do with gender issues. Charlene Haddock Siegfried, a 
superb scholar of pragmatism, makes a convincing case that pragmatism is a powerful analytic and 
organizing principle for feminism. But she is a lot less convincing when she tries to demonstrate that 
Dewey expressed a direct concern for gender. Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social 
Fabric. See also Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 167 fn 1 3 .  
271 Dewey to Lippmann, 14 January 1 930, Lippmann Papers, Yale Sterling Library. It is uncertain which of 
Dewey's books he was referring to, though it most likely was The Quest for Certainty. 
Though Lippmann graduated from Harvard, his papers are housed at Yale's  Sterling Library. There are 
only a limited number of items of correspondence between Dewey and Lippmann in the archives. Dewey's  
papers do not contain any additional items. Over the course of the years, they exchanged occasional letters, 
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Dewey wrote another letter in 194 1 ,  this one not to Lippmann but to James T. 
Farrell ,  the novelist: "I can't  but feel that L' s devotion now to classical learning and the 
Great Tradition is another case of Jewish inferiority compensatory reaction . . .  About 
Lippmann - it would be hard to find a more egregious example of concocted 
ignorance. "272 
In 1937 John Dewey reviewed Walter Lippmann' s  The Good Society which had 
been published that year. Dewey was harsh in his criticism. Lippmann had "give[n] 
encouragement and practical support to reactionaries . . .  because the picture he draws of 
Liberalism is in terms of an idealistic Utopia."273 The Good Society ignored the means 
that would be required to achieve the ends Lippmann had in mind. Lippmann' s  argument 
rested on "an extremely abstract simplification." Lippmann, Dewey wrote "has stated the 
legalistic and the lawyer' s conception of human relations better than any lawyer I know 
of has stated it." Most striking is this comment: "Lippmann, like many other well-
intentioned persons, is strong for government by law rather than by men . . .  " 
In 1 9 1 2  Lippmann had written something quite different, "Jealous of all individuals, 
democracies have turned to machines. They have tried to blot out human prestige, to 
minimize the influence of personality . . .  Governments have to be carried on by men, 
however much we distrust them."274 
always respectful and formal, offering advice regarding publishers, enlisting assistance, passing along 
requests for contributions to various organizations, expressing appreciation for providing and publishing 
articles, praising each other for an occasional essay. 272 John Dewey to James T. Farrell ,  February 18, 194 1  (Dewey papers Morris Library, Southern Illinois 
University), quoted in Diggins, "From Pragmatism to Natural Law: Walter Lippmann's Quest for the 
Foundation of Legitimacy," 534. 
273 John Dewey, "Liberalism in a Vacuum: A Critique of Walter Lippmann's Social Philosophy, "  review of 
An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society, by Walter Lippmann, Common Sense 6 ( 1937) : 489. 274 Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 16. 
They had traveled quite a distance in twenty-five years. 
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Andrew J. Bacevich is Professor of History and International Relations at Boston 
University, a graduate of West Point and a veteran of the Vietnam War. Bacevich is  the 
author of The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War.275 His 
cautionary message regarding America' s dangerous fixation on military power is 
especially convincing, coming as it does from a former officer and self-described 
conservative. He spoke out against the Iraq War before it began. He continues to be an 
eloquent opponent to the American occupation of Iraq and of the Bush administration ' s  
approach to foreign policy. 
On May 13 ,  2007, his 27 year old son, an Army 1st Lieutenant, was killed in Iraq. 
On May 27, 2007, his essay, "I Lost My Son to a War I Oppose," was published 
in the Washington Post. As a citizen, he wrote, he had tried to promote a critical 
understanding of U.S.  foreign policy in books, and articles, and in talks to groups, both 
large and small. 
Not for a second did I expect my own efforts to make a difference. But I did hope 
that my voice might combine with those of others - teachers, writers, activists and 
ordinary folks - to educate the public about the folly of the course on which the 
nation has embarked. I hoped that those efforts might produce a political climate 
conducive to change. 
This I can now see, was an illusion. 
Bacevich went on: 
The people have spoken, and nothing of substance has changed. The November 
2006 midterm elections signified an unambiguous repudiation of the policies that 
275 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005) .  
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landed us in our predicament. But half a year later, the war continues, with no end 
in sight. Indeed, by sending more troops to Iraq (and by extending the tours of 
duty of those, like my son, who were there already), Bush has signaled his 
complete disregard for what was once quaintly referred to as the "will of the 
people."276 
Eighty years after Walter Lippmann and John Dewey confronted the future of 
American democracy we have come to this.  Education, precisely the sort that Dewey had 
in mind, education intended to transform the habits and attitudes of the American 
citizenry, has failed. Walter Lippmann assured us, that if nothing else (and for him, there 
was nothing else), at least the American public had the wherewithal to vote no, and its 
voice would be heard. That too is a failed promise. 
How have we let this happen? 
276 Andrew J. Bacevich, "I Lost My Son to a War I Oppose. We Were Both Doing Our Duty, " Washington 
Post, May 27, 2007 2007. 
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